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"[T]he key to maintaining an equable and safe regional system is in politicw
and in economics .... Politics should pave the way from pure militar,
strategy to an enriched political and economic repertoire."
Shimon Peres'
"I was elected telling people I am going to physically separate us and the
Palestinians in order to encourage cooperation, mutual respect and trutst ...
I quoted Robert Frost about how good fences make good neighbors."
Ehud Barak 2
"Spring is the mischief in me, and I wonder
If I could put a notion in his head:
'Why do they make good neighbors?...
Before I built a wall I'd ask to know
What I was walling in or walling out,
And to whom I was like to give offense...
Robert Frost, Mending Walf
INTRODUCTION
Economic issues as part of a political solution in the Middle East
are nothing new. It is common knowledge that the United Nations
General Assembly Resolution 181 of November 29, 1947, stands for
a partition plan of mandatory Palestine. Fewer people know, how-
* Assistant Professor, Tel Aviv University Faculty of Law.
<grosso@post.tau.ac.il>. LL.B. (1986), Tel Aviv University; LL.M. (1992), S.J.D.
(1997), Harvard Law School. For helpful comments, I wish to thank Ruth Ben Is-
rael, Aharon Klieman, Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Philip Nichols, and Eli Sagi. Special
thanks to Elizabeth Garrett whose comments and insights have immensely im-
proved the final product. Earlier drafts of this Article were presented at Tel Aviv
University Faculty of Law, Harvard Law School, University of Michigan School
of Law, as well as at the annual meeting of the ASIL Economic Group held in Feb-
ruary 2000. I have greatly benefited from the comments of the participants in these
events.
1. SHIMON PERES, THE NEW MIDDLE EAST 34-35 (1993).
2. Lally Weymouth, The Peace of the Brave, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 8, 1999, at 46
(interview with Prime Minister Barak).
3. ROBERT FROST, Mending Wall, in COMPLETE POEMS OF ROBERT FROST 47,
48 (1949).
4. See Resolution on the Future Government of Palestine (Partition Resolu-
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ever, that the plan recommended by the General Assembly for adop-
tion and implementation with regard to the future government of Pal-
estine was a "Plan of Partition with Economic Union."' Economic
cooperation was included among the principles agreed upon by Israel
and the Palestine Liberation Organization ("PLO") in the framework
of the Declaration of Principles, signed on September 13, 1993." The
significance of the link between economic welfare and stable peace-
ful relations among nations was also formally acknowledged by the
drafters of the 1994 Protocol on Economic Relations, annexed to the
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip ("Paris Protocol").' The preamble to the Paris Protocol
states: "[t]he two parties view the economic domain as one of the
cornerstones in their mutual relations with a view to enhance their
interest in the achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive
peace."8 Similarly, a declaration issued at the conclusion of the first
tion), G.A. Res. 181 (II), U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., at 31, U.N. Doc. A/64 (1947), re-
printed in THE ISRAEL-ARAB READER-A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE
EAST CONFLICT 95-103 (Walter Laqueur & Barry Rubin eds., 5th rev. ed. 1995)
(providing selections from General Assembly Resolution 18 1 ).
5. Id. (emphasis added). Indeed, in the Declaration of the Establishment of the
State of Israel, it is explicitly stated that: "The State of Israel is prepared to cooper-
ate with the agencies and representatives of the United Nations in implementing
the resolution of the General Assembly of the 29th November, 1947, and will take
steps to bring about the economic union of the whole of Eretz-lsrael." See The
Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel. I OFFICIAL G.AZETTE I
(May 14, 1948).
6. Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization: Declaration of Principles on In-
terim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1525 (1993)
[hereinafter DOP]. See id. Article XI (the establishment of an Israeli-Palestinian
Economic Cooperation Committee), Annex III (detailing the areas on which the
Economic Cooperation Committee will focus), and Annex IV (regional develop-
ment program).
7. The Paris Protocol was signed on April 29, 1994. It was included as an an-
nex to the Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization Agreement on the Gaza Strip
and the Jericho Area, May 4, 1994, 33 IL.M. 622 (1994) (known as "'the Cairo
Agreement"). The Protocol was later partially incorporated and expanded upon in
the Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities, Aug. 29,
1994, 34 I.L.M. 455 (1995). Finally, it was included as Annex V of the Israel-
Palestinian Liberation Organization Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip, Sept. 28, 1995, 36 I.L.M. 551 (1997).
8. Paris Protocol, supra note 7, preamble. See generally PERES, supra note 1,
at 98 ("We do not view the agreement that was signed by us as a commercial one,
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Middle East/North Africa economic summit, convened in Casa-
blanca, Morocco on October 31-November 1, 1994, noted the par-
ticipants' agreement that "the progresses made in the peace process
should go along with a serious consideration of the socio-economic
disparities in the Region." 9 The summit participants considered en-
joyment of the economic dividends of peace crucial to establishing
and maintaining peaceful relations in the region.
As part of the Interim Agreement between Israel and the Palestin-
ian Liberation Organization, the Paris Protocol sought to regulate the
interim economic arrangement between Israel and the Palestinians
pending the formation of a permanent agreement between them. It
set up a concrete framework concerning the integration of the Israeli
and Palestinian economies, which was based primarily on the model
of a customs union. This framework established a single customs en-
velope, covering both Israel and the areas put under the control of the
Palestinian Authority, based on the Israeli customs regime and im-
but as a historic commitment with an economic lining. This will be the political
significance of the passage from an economy of confrontation to an economy of
peace .... ).
9. Casablanca Declaration, Middle East/North Africa Economic Sumnit, Oct.
31-Nov. 1, 1994, para. 8 (visited May 8, 2000) <www.lsrael-mfa.gov.il/
mfalgo.asp?mfah00pj0> (providing the text of the Casablanca Declaration).
10. See Address by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to the Middle East/North Al-
rica Economic Summit, Casablanca, Oct. 30-Nov. 1, 1994 (visited May 8, 2000)
<www.Israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?mfah0OrO0> [hereinafter Rabin Address] (em-
phasizing that for peace in the Middle East to be of substance, each country seek-
ing peace must realize the economic benefits such that "the man in the street will
sense, will feel, that as a result of the peace, he has got better chances for economic
and social development"); see also Ofira Seliktar, The Peace Dividend: The Econ-
ony of Israel and the Peace Process, in THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS:
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 223-24 (Ilan Peleg ed. 1998) (asserting that by
spreading the economic benefits of peace to the general population, government
leaders can encourage and increase public support for the peace process); Daniel
Lubetzky, Incentives for Peace and Profits: Federal Legislation to Encourage U.S.
Enterprises to Invest in Arab-Israeli Joint Ventures, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 405, 409-
10 (1994) (arguing that nations who interact economically have an interest in pre-
serving peace and stability between them); Philip Shenon, U.S. and Other Nations
Plan More Aid for Palestinians, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1998, at A6 (quoting Presi-
dent Clinton saying: "For too long, too many young people have turned to terror-
ism and old hatreds partly because they had nothing better to do. We must give
them a different future to believe in.").
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port policy."
Since 1994, however, there has been growing public support in Is-
rael for a physical separation between Israelis and Palestinians. The
idea of physical separation, which had gained much support among
Israelis during the Palestinian uprising, the "Intif( a," established its
position as the preferred political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict for most of the Israeli public as a result of recurrent periods
of terrorist attacks carried out by Palestinians in Israel. These attacks,
which included blowing up buses, placing bombs in crowded places,
and attacking civilians with knives, unnerved the Israeli public.IZ
Significantly, the current Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Barak, pub-
licly expressed his preference for what is known colloquially as the
"border fence option."'
' 3
This Article revisits the issue of the economic framework for a
permanent peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. It
takes as a starting point the linkage between economic development
11. See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (providing excerpts of deci-
sions and treaties describing the Israeli customs regime and its application to the
Palestinian Authority).
12. See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affhirs, Fatal Terrorist Attacks in Israel
Since the Declaration of Principles (visited May 11, 2000) <www.lsrael-
mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?mfah0cc4O> (noting that from September 13, 1993 to Sep-
tember 2, 1999, 256 civilians and soldiers were killed in terrorist attacks in Israel).
Public opinion polls conducted by the Tel Aviv University's Tami Steinmetz Cen-
ter for Peace Studies demonstrate that since early 1995 between three-quarters and
four-fifths of Israelis support a physical separation between Israelis and Palestini-
ans in the framework of a permanent peace settlement.
13. See Ora Koren, The Permanent Status Economic Arrangement Preferred bI
Israel: A Free Trade Agreement with tie AuthoritY, HA'ARETZ, June 16, 2000;
Daniel Klaidman & Matt Rees, A Separate Peace?, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 15, 1999, at
39 (stating that despite Barak's willingness to accepts a Palestinian state, he also
wants to separate Israel and the Palestinian Authority both economically and
physically). In a recent interview, Barak explained his thoughts on the matter of
separation as follows:
I was elected telling people I am going to physically separate us and the Pal-
estinians in order to encourage cooperation, mutual respect and trust. And in
order to encourage the development of the Palestinian Authority. I quoted
Robert Frost about how good fences make good neighbors. I think [a fence] is
needed for personal security and security of property. It is needed to give the
Palestinian infrastructure and economy a chance to stand on its own feet.
Weymouth, supra note 2, at 46.
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and welfare and the attainment of a just and long-lasting peace in the
Middle East. For peace to last among the former bitter enemies in the
Middle East, ensuring that the different parties have vested interests
and stakes in the success of the process is a crucial and necessary
step. '4 The economic dividends of peace can bolster political com-
promises and agreements, both on the individual and the communal-
national level.'" More specifically, the Article suggests that raising
the standard of living of the Palestinian people is critical to the
strengthening of peace between Israelis and Palestinians. As such, it
is as much an Israeli interest as it is a Palestinian one. In addition,
peace also holds the potential for an accelerated economic growth for
the region. This is so, in part, due to the lowering of defense expen-
ditures, coupled with the reallocation of resources currently used for
military needs, attraction of foreign investment, enhanced economic
efficiency based on regional trade, improvement of the regional in-
frastructure and human capital, and higher productivity.
The Article goes on to argue that economic growth and prosperity
will be better served by some sort of economic integration between
the Israeli and Palestinian economies than by separating the two.
Moreover, it argues that a deeper degree of integration is more likely
to be beneficial in this respect than lower level integration. Thus, it
suggests that, from a purely economic standpoint, a customs union
model is preferable to a free trade area model.
Focusing on the economic perspective, to the exclusion of other
considerations, leads, however, into the a trap of utopianism and ir-
relevance. In the Middle East, political, social, and cultural consid-
erations overshadow economic arguments and calculations. In order
to construct long-term meaningful structures for the economic rela-
14. See RUTH ARAD ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF PEACEMAKING - Focus ON
THE EGYPTIAN ISRAELI SITUATION 47-50 (1983) (discussing the concept of "vested
interest in peace" as referring to the welfare of interest groups which enjoy politi-
cal clout). I use the term "vested interests" here in a looser meaning than that.
15. See, e.g., Stanley Fischer & Thomas C. Schelling, Summary and Conclu-
sions, in SECURING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST I (Stanley Fischer et al. eds.,
1994) ("Peace in the Middle East will be secured only when it takes root in the
everyday lives of the people of the region. That will happen if the peace brings
open economic relations and economic development to the peoples and countries
of the region .... ).
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tions between Israelis and Palestinians, one must understand the ten-
sion between economics and politics in this region. It is precisely
such competing considerations that may lead to the conclusion that
separation between Israelis and Palestinians, or at least a relatively
low degree of economic integration between them, is to be preferred
to a deeper form of economic integration in the region. Thus, a ten-
sion is evident between the economic and political spheres.
The traditional discourse concerning economic integration, in gen-
eral, and in the Middle Eastern context, in particular, is not nuanced
sufficiently to strike a viable balance between these competing inter-
ests and goals. It is here that this Article seeks to offer an alternative
by proposing a new, more finely tuned model for economic integra-
tion in the region that will combine national and regional economic
welfare and development with the political interests of sovereignty,
national independence, and security. Thus, it seeks to reconcile the
political and economic meaning of borders within the framework of
transforming age old animosities into a long-lasting and just peace in
the region.
Part I of the Article discusses the separation-integration debate
concerning the relations between Israel and the Palestinians in its
historic and economic context. It also reviews the relevant political
positions and economic realities since the end of the Six-Day War.
Part II focuses on the tension between economic and political con-
siderations in structuring a viable economic model as part of a per-
manent peace agreement between Israelis and Palestinians. This part
starts with an exposition of the conflict between economic integra-
tion and interdependence and political particularism and national
sovereignty as it plays out in the Israeli-Palestinian context. It goes
on to analyze in detail the considerations influencing the selection
between complete separation and economic integration in the region.
This part of the Article also addresses specifically one of the major
concerns often expressed in opposition to economic integration in the
Middle East, namely the vast differences in size between the Israeli
and Palestinian economies. Bringing experience accumulated in
other regional trade arrangements, the Article demonstrates that,
while meriting heightened sensitivity to the needs of the economi-
cally weaker party, such economic differences should not bar a proc-
ess of regional integration. This part of the Article concludes that
2000] 1545
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some degree of economic integration between the two parties is de-
sirable in order to maintain long-term peaceful relations in the re-
gion.
Part III of the Article analyzes the potential implementation in the
Israeli-Palestinian context of the traditional models of economic in-
tegration with a particular focus on the models of a free trade area
("FTA") and customs union. Scrutinizing the strengths and weak-
nesses of the traditional models of economic integration, the Article
concludes that, while a deeper level of integration is economically
more efficient, it is politically problematic.
Thus, in Part IV, this Article puts forward an alternative model for
structuring the economic relations between the two parties. Based on
a concept of flexible, permeable borders, this alternative model pro-
motes bounded functional cooperation and integration between Israel
and the Palestinians. This model facilitates cooperation and integra-
tion while, at the same time, taking account of national aspirations
and political desires. While not necessarily a first-best model, this
model may well offer the best practical chances of achieving a suc-
cessful accommodation of the relevant economic and political con-
siderations.
In light of the foregoing, there are several parameters by which the
following discussion is framed. First, within the Middle Eastern set-
ting, the Article focuses on the economic prospects for a peaceful
settlement between Israelis and Palestinians. It does not address the
possibilities of more expansive regional trade arrangements that in-
clude additional countries in the region. A fundamental assumption
underlying this Article is that the establishment of an independent
Palestinian state is inevitable and the issues discussed should there-
fore be thought of in the framework of country-to-country (i.e., Is-
rael-to-Palestine) relations. Second, this Article concentrates on the
issue of the appropriate trade regime to be implemented between the
two parties with respect to the movement of goods, services, and la-
bor. It does not discuss fiscal and monetary issues and the movement
of capital.'" Finally, the analysis proposed below focuses, for the
16. See Arie Amon & Jimmy Weinblatt, Sovereignty and Economic Develop-
ment: From an hIterim Agreement to a Permanent Settlement between the Israelis
and the Palestinians, 47 ECON. Q. 33, 43 (2000) (noting that issues of monetary or
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most part, on the national level of analysis, i.e., on the state-to-state
level, rather than on a more systemic level or on the level of domes-
tic decision-making and politics.' Thus, for example, the Article
does not analyze the internal workings of different domestic interest
groups operating within each of the relevant actors and their effect
on the makings of national policies."' Although clearly the influence
of such groups has played a significant role in shaping the economic
and political relations between the relevant actors, and probably will
continue to play such a role in the future, analyzing the contours of
that influence and its workings is a matter for separate research.
fiscal policy are not dependent on, nor do they impact, the existence of economic
borders between Israel and Palestine).
17. The distinction between the various levels of analysis is well developed in
international relations literature. See, e.g., KENNETH N. WALTZ, MAN, THE STATE,
AND WAR: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS (1959) (distinguishing between three levels
of analysis: the international system; the nature of the state; and human nature);
ARNOLD WOLFERS, DISCORD AND COLLABORATION: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS (1962) (describing two levels of analysis: internal and external); ROBERT
JERVIS, PERCEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1976) (ex-
ploring four levels of analysis: external environment, i.e., the international system;
domestic sources; bureaucratic politics; and decision making).
18. See Federation of Israeli Chambers of Commerce, Israel and the Palestinian
Authority- Towards Economic Permanent Status Arrangements, July 25, 1999 (on
file with the author) (rejecting the continuation of a customs envelope covering
both Israel and the areas under the control of the Palestinian Authority, and ex-
pressing preference for monetary, fiscal and tariff separation between Israel and
Palestine based on a physical border, on the one hand, and a free trade area regime,
on the other hand). There is a wealth of literature on the role of domestic interest
groups in shaping national trade policy. See, e.g., Enrico Colombatto & Jonathan
R. Macey, A Public Choice Model of International Economic Cooperation and the
Decline of the Nation State, 18 CARDOZO L. REv,. 925 (1996) (explaining the pub-
lic choice theory of international regulatory competition and coordination and ap-
plying the public choice theory to international banking and securities law); Paul
B. Stephan III, Barbarians hIside the Gate: Public Choice Theor
, 
and Interna-
tional Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 745 (1995) (examining pub-
lic choice theory and its relevance to international economic law).
19. See, e.g., J.W. Wright, Jr., Competing Trade Agendas in the Arab-Israeli
Peace Process - A Case Studies Approach, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
MIDDLE EAST PEACE - THE IMPACT OF COMPETING TRADE AGENDAS 40 (J.W.
Wright, Jr. ed., 1999); Jonathan Nitzan & Shimshon Bichler, The Impermanent
War Economy? Peace Dividends and Capital Accumulation in Israel, in THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MIDDLE EAST PEACE: THE IMPACT OF COMPETING TRADE
AGENDAS 73, 96-98 (J.W. Wright, Jr. ed., 1999) (analyzing the causes for the mo-
bilization of Israel's conglomerates for purposes of regional reconciliation).
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I. INTEGRATION AND SEPARATION IN THE
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONTEXT - HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVES
A. THE ROOTS OF THE DEBATE
The magnitude of the military defeat of the Arab forces in 1967
and the speed by which their collapse was brought about, as well as
Israel's ability to gain control of the Sinai, the Golan Heights, East
Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, 0 came as a shock to
the Arab nations and their allies. They also surprised Israel itself. 
2
One important outcome of that surprise was the lack of a coherent
policy and comprehensive planning concerning the future of the Ter-
ritories and their relationship to Israel."
Soon after the end of the 1967 war, two competing views devel-
oped in the Israeli government regarding the nature of the desired
economic relations between Israel and the Territories. Moshe Dayan,
the powerful Minister of Defense, advocated the integration of the
two economies into a single economic unit and argued for the free
movement of not only goods and services, but also labor and capital.
Dayan also supported the integration and linkage of the infrastructure
20. In the rest of this Article, reference shall be made exclusively to the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip (collectively, "the Territories").
21. See CHAIM HERZOG, THE ARAB-ISRAELI WARS: WAR AND PEACE IN THE
MIDDLE EAST 189 (1982) (characterizing victory in the Six Day War as "astound-
ing and unexpected.").
22. See SHLOMo GAZIT, PETAIM BE-MALKODET [TRAPPED] 27-32 (1999) (not-
ing the lack of planning prior to the 1967 war, concerning the possibility of having
to establish a military government in areas outside the Israeli territory, the absence
of political planning, after the war has ended, as to the political future of the terri-
tories, and the "shock of victory" within the Israeli public after the war).
This section of the Article focuses on the debate within Israel for two rea-
sons. First, no similar debate took place within the Palestinian population in the
Territories until relatively recently. Second, since the development of the Palestin-
ian economy was mostly influenced by its links to the Israeli economy, and since
those links have been controlled and shaped almost exclusively by Israel, it is Is-
raeli views and opinions on the issue at hand that mattered most, at least in the
past. See ARIE ARNON ET AL., THE PALESTINIAN ECONOMY - BETWEEN IMPOSED
INTEGRATION AND VOLUNTARY SEPARATION 6 (1997) (discussing how the "links
between the two economies were decided in Israel.").
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of the Territories with Israel's.:" His major opponent was the equally
powerful Minister of Finance, Pinhas Sapir, who opposed the elimi-
nation of an economic border between the two economies with re-
spect to the movement of labor.2"
Economic realities proved stronger than governmental decisions
and ministerial positions." The end of the war witnessed high unem-
ployment rates in the Territories. On the one hand, there were no
substantial investments made in the Territories. At the same time, Is-
raeli manufacturers were not permitted to establish factories and
plants in those areas. 6 It appeared that the Israeli government
adopted a protectionist stance against the industrialization of the Ter-
ritories for fear of competition with Israeli manufacturers.2' The eco-
nomic boom of the Israeli economy in the years following the 1967
war, on the other hand, resulted in an urgent need for working hands,
especially in such sectors as construction and agriculture. As a result,
23. See SHLOMo GAZIT, HA-MAKEL VEHA-GEZER: HAMIMSHAL HAYI'SRE'ELI
BIYEHUDAH VESHOMRON [THE CARROT AND THE STICK - ISRAEL'S POLICY IN
JUDEA AND SAMARIA] 141, 147-50 (1985).
24. See SHABTAI TEVETH, KILELAT HA-BERAKHAH [THE CURSED BLESSING:
THE STORY OF ISRAEL'S OCCUPATION OF THE VEST BANK] 283-92 (2d ed. 1973)
(detailing the debate between Dayan and Sapir).
25. See GAZIT, supra note 23, at 254 (noting that employment of the Palestin-
ian residents of the Territories was not an Israeli governmental initiative, but rather
sprang from the "reality of life," and further noting that prior to 1973, the Israeli
government had engaged in an ongoing struggle to thwart the employment of Pal-
estinian laborers in Israel); GAZIT, supra note 22, at 155-57.
26. See GAZIT, supra note 23, at 150 (positing that the failure of the Israeli
government to permit and encourage Israeli investment to develop industry in the
Territories was a primary cause of the continuing chasm between the Israeli and
Palestinian economies).
27. See, e.g., SARA Roy, THE GAZA STRIP: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DE-
DEVELOPMENT 4 (1995) (arguing that Israel deliberately prevented economic de-
velopment of the Territories in order to keep the Palestinians economically and
politically subservient and documenting the "impact of Israeli occupation policy on
economic development in the Gaza Strip"). But see ARNON, supra note 22, at 9-10
(claiming that existing data is insufficient to conclude that there was a calculated
long-term protectionist policy as opposed to responses to immediate needs and
pressures); GAzIT, supra note 23, at 179 (noting Israel's goal to prevent its control
over the Territories from becoming economically burdensome on the Israeli econ-
omy as a major reason behind Israel's failure to positively act to develop the Ter-
ritories).
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thousands of Palestinians chose to take advantage of the geographic
proximity to the Israeli market in order to seek employment in Israel,
albeit illegally at first. The vast differences in income of those Pales-
tinians as compared with their neighbors who continued to be em-
ployed in the Territories, combined with the other factors noted
above, soon made the movement of Palestinian workers into Israel an
established feature of the economic relations between Israel and thePalestinians."' Noting these trends, in October 1970 the Israeli Cabi-
net decided that Palestinians holding work permits were entitled to
work in Israel for wages equal to those earned by Israeli workers in
similar positions. 9 By 1972, economic integration between Israel and
the Territories was "almost complete."3" Rather than limiting the free
movement of Palestinian workers into Israel, a policy of "open
bridges," not only between the Territories and Jordan, but also be-
tween the Territories and Israel, came to life." Palestinian labor
could move freely into Israel, and Israeli goods could be exported
freely to the Territories. Likewise, Palestinian goods could be sold in
Israel, although Israel imposed various trade barriers for protectionist
reasons, especially with respect to agricultural goods."2 This was of
great significance in light of the special place of agriculture in the
Palestinian economy.
28. See GAZIT, supra note 23, at 252-58.
29. See Guy Mundlak, Power Breaking or Power-Entrenching Law: The
Regulation of Palestinian Workers in Israel, CoMP. LABOR L. & POL'Y J. (forth-
coming fall 2000) (on file with the author).
30. See ARNON, supra note 22, at 5.
31. See generally GAZIT, supra note 23, at 204-22 (noting that while originally
the policy of "open bridges" referred solely to the decision to allow movement
from the West Bank to Jordan via the bridges crossing the Jordan River, the "open
bridges" policy became a prong in a greater political program designed to elimi-
nate barriers and integrate the Palestinian and Israeli economies); see also GAZIT,
supra note 22, at 68-69.
32. See ARNON, supra note 22, at 5 (arguing that Israel imposed various trade
barriers on Palestinian agricultural products designed to make it harder for Pales-
tinian growers to market their produce in Israel and further noting that those barri-
ers were later replaced by a manufacture and growing quotas regime implemented
in the Territories themselves by the Israeli military government).
33. See id. at 18-19 (noting the Palestinian economy traditionally relied heavily
on the agricultural sector); Raymond Vernon et al., Agriculture, Industrv, Services,
and Trade, in SECURING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 45, 53-54 (Stanley Fischer et
1550 [15:1539
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B. ECONOMIC REALITIES
A cursory view of the economic relations between Israel and the
Palestinians prior to 1994 reveals two striking features. First, the
shaping of such relations was almost entirely a matter for Israel. The
Palestinians had not played a significant role in that context and did
not have a say in any decision-making processes in these matters.
Second, the huge economic gaps between the two peoples were
marked by a one-sided dependence of the Palestinian economy on Is-
rael. The economic relations between Israel and the Palestinians have
been traditionally characterized as constituting "asymmetric trade
relations. ' Furthermore, these relations were not based on a volun-
tary arrangement between two parties of relatively equal bargaining
power and leverage; instead, Israel unilaterally shaped their con-
tours.35
Israel is an economic giant compared with the Palestinian econ-
omy and the economies of all of its neighbors." In 1998, the gross
national product ("GNP") per capita in Israel stood at a level of
$16,180. 37 At the same time, the figures for the Territories, Egypt,
Jordan, and Syria stood at $1,560, $1,290, $1,1 50, and S1,020, re-
spectively."' In GNP and gross domestic product ("GDP") terms, the
al eds., 1994) (noting that the Palestinian economy resembles low-income econo-
mies in its reliance on the agricultural sector).
34. INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD
BANK, 2 DEVELOPING THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: AN INVESTMENT IN PEACE,
71e Economy 45 (1993).
35. ARNON, supra note 22, at 88 (describing the trade regime that existed be-
tween Israel and the Palestinian economy since 1967 as "an invountar" one-sided,
impure, customs union"). The authors note that "[s]ince there was no Palestinian
(economic) authority and Palestinians did not participate in policy-making, all de-
cisions were made by the Israeli authorities." Id.
36. See, e.g., Patrick Clawson, Mideast Economies .Afier the Israel-PLO Hand-
shake, 48 J. INT'L AFF. 141, 159 (1994) ("In many areas in which functional coop-
eration has been proposed, Israel is the giant that, no matter how well-intentioned,
has the potential to overwhelm its neighbors.").
37. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 2000 (2000) (providing
national development statistics). Country data is also available online at
<http://\v-v.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/countrydata.html> [hereinafter WDI
2000].
38. See id.
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combined economies of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank are about
4.5 percent and 3.6 percent the size of the Israeli economy, respec-
tively.39 In fact, Israel's GDP - $100.5 billion in 1998 - exceeds the
combined GDP of Egypt ($82.7 billion), Jordan ($7.4 billion), and
the Territories ($3.6 billion). 40 There are substantial economic differ-
ences between the relative sizes of the Israeli and Palestinian econo-
mies, and between the relevant economies' level of development and
the structure of the domestic markets.4' Whereas Israel is a developed
country specializing increasingly in the production of high technol-
ogy products, its neighbors' comparative advantages lie in the pro-
duction of low-tech, labor-intensive products.
Since 1967, Israel constituted the lion's share of Palestinian trade.
Up to ninety percent of all imports to the Territories came from or
through Israel while eighty-five percent of all Palestinian exports
went to or through Israel.4 - Export of labor services to Israel formed a
particularly significant portion of the Palestinian GNP. 3 In 1992, for
example, Israeli employers employed over one third of the Palestin-
ian work force, or almost 116,000 people.4 Most of these Palestini-
39. See ARNON, supra note 22, at 12-13 (noting that the economic gap is more
pronounced when measured in GDP terms since there is a substantial difference
between the Territories' GNP and GDP, with the former exceeding the latter, due,
primarily, to the Palestinian economy's heavy reliance on the export of labor serv-
ices to Israel and private remittances from abroad); Vernon, supra note 33, at 47.
40. See WDI 2000, supra note 37 (comparing Israel's economy with its neigh-
bors').
41. See id. at Table 5.11 (noting that there were 187.41 intemet hosts per
10,000 people in Israel in July 1999, compared to 0, 0.28, 1.17, and 0 internet hosts
per 10,000 people in the Territories, Egypt, Jordan and Syria, respectively).
42. See ARNON, supra note 22, at 34-37 (noting the Palestinian dependence on
Israel in as much as trade is concerned); ISHAC DIWAN & RADWAN A. SHABAN
(EDS.), DEVELOPMENT UNDER ADVERSITY - THE PALESTINIAN ECONOMY IN
TRANSITION 6 (1999), also available online at <www.palecon.org/wbdocs/ Devel-
opmentUnder _Adversity.pdf>.
43. See Sharif S. Elmusa & Mahmud El-Jaafari, Power and Trade: The Israeli-
Palestinian Economic Protocol, 24(2) J. PALESTINE STUD. 14, 28 (1995) (describ-
ing Palestinian labor in Israel as a "necessary evil" for both sides, particularly for
the Palestinians). See generally MICHAEL SHALEV, LABOR AND THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY IN ISRAEL (1992); LEV L. GRINBERG, THE HISTADRUT ABOVE ALL 162-
205 (1993).
44. See infra note 46 and the accompanying graph.
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ans were employed in low-skill, manual labor jobs in construction,
agriculture and services. The income from Palestinian employment
in Israel contributed directly to about twenty-five percent of the Ter-
ritories' GNP and added to it indirectly by increasing demand for lo-
cally produced goods, thus further contributing to the GDP.' While
the exact figures have fluctuated throughout the period of Israel's
rule over the Territories, as shown in the graph on the next page, the
overall picture of a one-sided economic dependence remained largely
intact and unchanged.
45. See Oren Gross & Eli Sagi, The Israeli-Palestinian Economic Permanent
Status Agreement and Trade Regime, 47 ECON. Q. 50, 57 (2000) (discussing the
multiplier effect); ARNON, supra note 22, at 19 (suggesting that the share of Pales-
tinian workers' remittances in the overall Palestinian GNP "is probably the highest
level in the world.").
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To complete the picture, it is important to note that even under
such conditions (and, it may be argued, precisely because of them)
the Palestinian economy's rate of growth far outpaced that of Is-
46. See Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, National Accounts of the Judea,
Samaria and the Gaza Area 1968-1993, Special Report, No. 1012 (1996). There are
significant difficulties in ascertaining the actual numbers of Palestinians working
in Israel since 1994. With the implementation of the closure policy by the Israeli
government, for example, a significant discrepancy appeared between reports ac-
counting only for permit-holding Palestinian workers employed in Israel, and those
reports that attempt also to estimate the number of informal workers, i.e., Palestini-
ans who work in Israel without a permit. As these latter figures are based on esti-
mates, variances are inevitable. In fact, the number of Palestinians working without
a permit has exceeded the number of permit-holders at any given period. In the ab-
sence of clear measurement criteria and effective monitoring system, each side
"chose" its own data. For the years 1995-98 the graph in the text is based on the
total numbers of permit holders as well as on estimates of non-permit-holding
workers who actually worked in Israel. See generally ARNON, supra note 22, at 75
(listing employment data from the ICBS for Gaza Strip and West Bank residents
working in Israel and locally); B'Tselem, Poalei Zion - Human Rights Violations
of Palestinians from the Occupied Territories Working in Israel and the Settle-
mnents 12 (1999) (providing a historic overview of entry of Palestinian workers in
Israel, their place and numbers in the Israeli economy, restrictions on their move-
ment, and interactions with Israeli security forces); World Bank Group, West Bank
and Gaza Updates (visited June 8, 2000) <http:wbln00I8.worldbank.org/
mna/mena/nsf> (reporting quarterly on recent economic developments and World
Bank activities in the Territories).
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rael's, at least until the early 1980s.47 In that respect, the forced eco-
nomic integration with the Israeli market greatly contributed to the
rise in the individual Palestinian's standard of living as well as the
41growth of the economy.
The (forced) economic integration between Israel and the Territo-
ries was at its peak from 1967 to 1987. The outbreak of the the Inti-
fada in December 1987 led to a counter-movement toward greater
separation between the two markets. This resulted in a subsequent
decrease in the number of Palestinian workers employed in the Is-
raeli labor market, a decline in the total weekly hours worked by Pal-
estinian workers in Israel, 9 a widening wage differential between the
two markets, 0 and a decrease in Palestinian exports and imports."
47. See Barbara Kotschwar, Small Countries and the Free Trate Area of the
Americas, in TRADE RULES IN THE MAKING - CHALLENGES IN REGIONAL AND
MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS 134, 135-36 (Miguel Rodriguez Mendoza et al.
eds., 1999) (explaining the economic theory concerning regional trade arrange-
ments, which forecasts that under a liberalized free trade regime between econo-
mies of differing sizes, the smaller economy stands to benefit more than its larger
counterpart from liberalization and the lifting of trade restrictions, due to gains of
efficiency and economies of scale).
48. See ARNON, supra note 22, at 21 (noting the average annual rates of GDP
growth in 1968-90 were 5.4 percent for the Gaza Strip and 7.4 percent for the West
Bank, compared with 4.5 percent in Israel). Economic data clearly demonstrates
the significant rise in disposable income in the Territories following 1967 (af-
fected, primarily, by the access opportunities to the Israeli labor market and its af-
fect on the domestic Palestinian market) and the concomitant rapid growth in con-
sumption per capita. Id. at 23; see also Ephraim Kleiman, The Economic
Provisions of the Agreement Between Israel and the PLO, 28 ISRAEL L. REV. 347,
350 (1994) (commenting that GNP per capita in the Territories almost quadrupled
in 1969-92, whereas in Israel it hardly doubled). But see MARK TESSLER, A
HISTORY OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT 525-28 (1994) (revealing the
Palestinian view that forced economic integration did not result in an improved
standard of living for Palestinians as evidenced by substandard housing, education,
etc., and that the export of labor was not a signal of economic development, but
rather a signal of deepening dependence of the territories on Israel).
49. See ARNON, supra note 22, at 77 (determining that although more Pales-
tinian workers worked in Israel in 1992 than in 1987, the total number of hours
worked by such workers in 1987 was larger than the equivalent figure for 1992).
50. See id. (arguing that the widening gap means that a higher premium was
attached to working in Israel and indicates a degree of separation between the Is-
raeli and Palestinian labor markets).
51. Id. at 35, 93, 99 (illustrating the dramatic fall in trade after 1987 graphically
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There is a clear, yet often overlooked, link between the outbreak
of the Intifada and negative trends that developed with respect to the
economy of the Territories and its relationship with the Israeli econ-
omy. The Israeli economy slowed down during the late 1970s and
1980s, real wages eroded as a result of high inflation rates in Israel,
unemployment levels rose in the Territories during the 1980s, and
the economies of the Gulf states, where many Palestinians were em-
ployed, contracted, affecting the jobs available in these countries for
Palestinians and the amount of remittances from such employment
entering the Territories. Privation, therefore, is closely linked to the
turn to violence as a political measure of desperation."
The September 13, 1993 signing of the Declaration of Principles
on the White House lawn and the conclusion of the Paris Protocol in
April 1994, were to signify the dawn of an old-new era. This era was
"old" in the sense of return to the format of economic integration, but
"new" insofar as that integration was based on a consensual, rather
and with a series of trade data from 1968 to 1993).
52. See, e.g., BARUCH KIMMERLING & JOEL S. MIGDAL, PALESTINIANS - THE
MAKING OF A PEOPLE 259-61 (1993) (linking the economic downturn in Israel with
the Intifada). The authors note that:
[t]he bleakness of national prospects thus combined with despair over indi-
vidual and family prospects. Added to this dismal brew were the personal ex-
periences of routine harassment, occasional beatings, arrests without formal
charges, and humiliating searches by security forces at roadblocks and check-
points. Young Palestinians increasingly felt there was little to lose if they
broke the rules of the game ....
Id.; see also ZE'EV SCHIFF & EHUD YAARI, INTIFADA 71 (1990) (in Hebrew). A
chapter entitled, "The Raging Proletariat," describes the Intifada's breakout as "re-
bellion of the poor, an awesome outburst by the forsaken and the bottom at the
bottom of the social scale." Schiff and Yaari argue that:
[u]ndoubtedly, in the beginning the uprising grew out of the conditions of
hardship under which the [Palestinian] refugees continued to live under the Is-
raeli rule - and not out of the desires planted in their hearts by the PLO. The
daily hardship greased the wheels of momentum - not the expectations of a
better political future.
Id. at 72 (translated by the author). See also Gad G. Gilbar, Demographic and
Economic Developments as Causes for the Intifada, in AT THE CORE OF TIIE
CONFLICT: THE INTIFADA 20 (Gad G. Gilbar & Asher Susser eds., 1992) (analyz-
ing the link between economic deprivation and the outbreak of the Intifada).
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than unilateral, understanding. 3 The Paris Protocol, based on the
model of a customs union," established a single customs envelope
covering both Israel and the areas put under the control of the Pales-
tinian Authority." This customs envelope, which was based on the
Israeli customs regime and import policy, sought to harmonize tariff
rates, purchase tax and value added tax rates, import procedures,
price evaluations and product classifications for customs purposes,
and technical requirements and standards."' However, in recognition
53. See ARNON, supra note 22, at 7 ("As regards the economic arrangements,
the most dramatic change was the mutual recognition that there were two legiti-
mate parties to every economic decision affecting the Palestinian economy.").
54. See Kleiman, supra note 48, at 370 (explaining that the Paris Protocol does
not mention the term "customs union" because the Palestinians rejected this con-
cept in order to emphasize their separateness from Israel).
55. PCA 2736/98 Habboub Bros. Co. and Others v. Nike International Ltd. and
Others (decision of the Israeli Supreme Court, March 6, 2000), at § 11 ("Israel and
the Palestinian Authority are included in one customs envelope ... [which means
that] the importation of goods to Israel, for purposes of sale, marketing, or for any
other commercial purpose, in the territory of the Palestinian Authority, will be re-
garded as importation of goods into Israel itself.") (translated by the author); See
also Meir Kapota, Taxation and Trade Arrangements between Israel and the Pal-
estinian Authority, 13(4) MISSIM A9 (Part i) & 13(5) Missii A17 (Part ii) (1999),
at Part ii, at A18 (describing the Paris Protocol as creating a customs union be-
tween Israel and the Palestinian Authority); David P. Fidler, Peace Through
Trade? Developments in Palestinian Trade Law During the Peace Process, 38 VA.
J. INT'L L. 155, 161-62 (1998) (describing the Paris Protocol arrangement as a
compromise, which provided for free movement of goods between Israel and the
Territories while establishing a customs union); Joel Singer, The Israeli-
Palestinian Interim Agreement on Self-Government Arrangements in the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip - Some Legal Aspects, 27 MISHPATIM 605, 626 (1997)
(stating that the basic principle underlying the Paris Protocol was the establishment
of a customs union); Yoram Gabai, Agreement on Tariffs and Trade between Israel
and the Palestinians, 8(3) MISsIM A1, A5 (1994).
56. See Paris Protocol, supra note 7. Article 111(5) of the Paris Protocol states
the following:
a. ... the Israeli rates of customs, purchase tax, levies, excises and other
charges, prevailing at the date of signing of the Agreement, as changed from
time to time, shall serve as the minimum basis for the Palestinian Authority.
The Palestinian Authority may decide on any upward changes in the rates on
these goods and exceeding quantities when imported by the Palestinians to the
Areas.
b. ... Israel and the Palestinian Authority will employ for all imports the
same system of importation... including inter alia standards, licensing,
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of the special links between the Palestinians and the neighboring
Arab countries, and the need for independence in setting Palestinian
trade policy, the Paris Protocol grants the Palestinian Authority the
power (albeit limited to goods agreed upon by the parties and by
quotas) to set its own trade policy with respect to imports from Arab
countries.17 Of course, within the customs envelope, goods were to
move freely between Israel and the Territories.5" Finally, Article
country of origin, valuation for customs purposes etc.
Article 111(10) of the Protocol adds:
Except for the goods on Lists Al and A2 and their quantities.., both sides
will maintain the same import policy (except for rates of import taxes and
other charges for goods in List B) and regulations including classification,
valuation and other customs procedures, which are based on the principles
governing international codes, and the same policies of import licensing and
of standards for imported goods, all as applied by Israel with respect to its
importation. Israel may from time to time introduce changes in any of the
above, provided that changes in standard requirements will not constitute a
non-tariff-barrier and will be based on considerations of health, safety and the
protection of the environment ....
Id.
57. See Elmusa & El-Jaafari, supra note 43, at 20-23 (outlining rules govern-
ing imports and exports under the Paris Protocol). Lists Al and A2 include food
and agricultural products (with the exception of fresh fruits and vegetables), basic
construction materials, fertilizers, and household electric appliances. List B in-
cludes capital goods for economic development, such as agricultural equipment,
heavy construction equipment, and factory and household textile machinery and
tools. Goods included in List B are not subject to any tariff, rules of origin, or
quantity restrictions under the Paris Protocol, although their import is subject to
other aspects of Israel's import policy (e.g., standards), whereas goods included in
the Al or A2 lists are subject to quotas and rules of origin. In addition, special ar-
rangements are structured under the Paris Protocol with respect to petroleum and
petroleum products and cars. See id.; see also Kleiman, supra note 48, at 358-60
(commenting that the purpose of the exemption from the Israeli import regime for
the items on lists Al and A2 was to permit Palestinians to import from countries
with which Israel did not trade at the time of the agreement). The exemptions in-
cluded in Lists A 1, A2 and B may also be seen "as an alternative to power sharing"
between Israel and the Palestinians with respect to imports into the customs enve-
lope. See id. at 371. See also Gabai, supra note 55, at A6-A7; Kapota Part ii, supra
note 55, at Al9-A24; Nu'man Kanafani, Trade Relations Between Palestine and
Israel: Free Trade Area or Customs Union? 20-23 (1996).
58. See Paris Protocol, supra note 7, Art. IX(I) (stating that "[tihere will be
free movement of industrial goods free of any restrictions including customs and
import taxes between the two sides, subject to each side's legislation."). While a
similar provision deals with the free movement of agricultural produce between the
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VII(1) of the Paris Protocol states that "[b]oth sides will attempt to
maintain the normality of movement of labor between them, subject
to each side's right to determine from time to time the extent and
conditions of the labor movement into its area. "' 4
Reality proved to be much more fickle, however, and it soon un-
dermined much of the hard-fought-for agreement. Responding to an
increase in Palestinian terrorist activity, aimed primarily at Israel's
civilian population,60 the Israeli government applied a relatively strict
closure policy to the Territories, periodically sealing them off from
Israel and preventing movement between the Gaza Strip and the
West Bank.6' As a result, the economic crisis, which plagued the Pal-
two parties, such movement is subject to several exceptions and arrangements
specified concerning, primarily, veterinary and plant protection needs.
59. Id. at Article VII(l).
60. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing terrorist attacks that
led to the closure response).
61. See UNSCO, Closure on the West Bank and Gaza, Fact Sheet (Aug.-Sept.
1997) (visited May 8, 2000) <wwvw.arts.mcgill.ca/meppunsco/closure001097.
html> [hereinafter UNSCO, Closure] (reporting on the number of closure days,
income and trade losses, and short and the long-term impact of closures). Under
the closure policy, movement from the Territories to Israel was only allowed to
Palestinians holding special permits of limited duration issued for that purpose by
Israel. The criteria developed for the purpose of determining who would receive a
permit were designed to prevent terrorists from legally entering Israel. Thus, for
example, to be eligible for a worker's permit, an individual ought to be married
and over a certain age. The idea is, of course, that young, unmarried men, are more
likely to engage in acts of terrorism (and especially in acts of suicide-bombing)
than older, married men. In addition, Israel has also imposed "total closures" on
the Territories, usually after particularly serious terrorist attacks that had been car-
ried out in Israel proper. Under such circumstances, all Palestinians were barred
from entering Israel. See id.; see also Serge Schmemann. Gazans" Plea to
Netanyahu: Stop Closing Us Out of Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1996, at AI (de-
scribing economic hardships on Palestinians as a result of "closures" and the effect
on Gaza, which is more dependent on jobs in Israel), West Bank anti Gaza. The
Banging Door, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 3, 1996, at 39: Kleiman, supra note 48, at
372-73 (noting that as early as 1994, warnings were made that "frequent closures
can play havoc with the economic logic underlying the whole [Paris Protocol].
Furthermore, the more security precautions take the form of physical borders, the
louder and more numerous will be the voices clamouring on both sides for eco-
nomic borders as well. . ."). For a critique of the lack of clear, transparent rules
governing the issuance of permits see Fatemeh Ziai, Hunian Rights Violations as
an Obstacle to Economic Developnent: Restrictions on Movenent in the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MIDDLE EAST P1ACE -
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estinian economy throughout the years of the Intifada, worsened.
Both real GNP and real GNP per capita significantly declined.'2 The
relative weight of international trade demonstrated a similar pattern,
with merchandise exports from the Territories falling from eleven
percent to six percent of GDP between 1992 and 1995, and imports
falling from forty-six percent to thirty-eight percent of GDP during
the same period.63 Estimates are that between 1994 and 1996 the
level of standard of living in the Territories declined by some
twenty-five percent.6 The heightened state of security led to more
stringent inspection of Palestinian goods moving into Israel and fur-
ther encumbered the movement of Palestinian goods and persons, re-
sulting in increased costs of Palestinian trade." Various estimates put
the cost to the Palestinian economy of each day of closure at around
THE IMPACT OF COMPETING TRADE AGENDAS 128, 135-36 (J.W. Wright, Jr. Ed.,
1999).
62. As reliable economic data relating to the relevant period is difficult to get
by, different figures may be quoted by different sources which are not always
compatible with each other. Some of the figures are based on estimates and should
be interpreted cautiously. UNSCO, Economic and Social Conditions in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip, Quarterly Report, April 1997 (visited May 8, 2000)
<www.arts.mcgill.ca/MEPP/unsco/qr2/qr2.html> [hereinafter UNSCO April 1997]
(reporting that between 1992 and 1996 there was a decline in the Palestinian GNP
and GNP per capita of 18.4 percent and 36.1 percent, respectively); UNSCO, Eco-
nonic and Social Conditions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Quarterly Report,
October 1997 (visited May 8, 2000) <www.arts.mcgill.ca/MEPP/unsco/qr3
/qr3.html> [hereinafter UNSCO October 1997] (reporting that in 1996 GNP and
GNP per capita declined by 3 percent and 8.6 percent, respectively); UNSCO. Re-
port on Social and Economic Conditions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, October
1998 (visited May 8, 2000) <www.arts. mcgill.ca/ programs/polisci/faculty/rexb/
unsco98/sectionl.html> [hereinafter UNSCO October 1998] (reporting that in
1997, real GNP per capita continued to decline 3 to 4 percent while real GNP grew
by 2 percent).
63. See World Bank Group, The West Bank and Gaza: Countri' Overview (vis-
ited May 11, 2000) <www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/offrep/mena/wb&g.htm>
(summarizing the current economic trends in the Territories).
64. The decline was more pronounced in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank.
This is due, among other things, to the fact that it is much easier to seal-off the
Gaza Strip than it is to do the same with respect to the West Bank.
65. See Fidler, supra note 55, at 164-66 (noting that closures resulted in the
breakdown of the free trade area and undermined economic development in Pales-
tine).
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$4.4 million."6
Further costs were added as a result of a cobweb of export and im-
port licensing requirements.67 Due to potential security risks and clo-
sures, which made showing up to work on a regular basis far from
guaranteed, Israeli employers considered Palestinian workers less re-
liable. Israeli employers, therefore, began replacing Palestinian
workers with foreign workers imported from East Europe, the Far
East, and Africa.6 These foreign workers filled the vacancies in
manual labor sectors such as the construction industry and agricul-
ture. In 1992, more than a third of the Palestinian work force was
employed in Israel contributing about twenty-five percent of the
GNP, but in 1996, only seven percent of the Palestinian work force
was similarly employed contributing no more than six percent to the
GNP. 69 Many of the Palestinians previously employed in Israel could
not find alternative sources of income and the rate of unemployment
in the Territories soared to an annual average rate of thirty percent,"
while per capita income plummeted twenty percent between 1993
and 1996. 7'
Several additional factors must be mentioned in order to complete
the picture. First, foreign investors are reluctant to invest in the Ter-
66. See UNSCO April 1997, supra note 62 (claiming that closures have cost
the Palestinian economy approximately S6.5 billion during the period 1993 to
1996); DIWAN & SHABAN, supra note 42, at 51 (suggesting that S2.8 billion was
the cost of the permit system and border closures for the same period); Ziai, supra
note 61, at 140-41 (arguing that closures resulted in Palestine's loss of trade com-
petitiveness with the rest of the world).
67. See Fidler, supra note 55, at 170 (describing various actors who must issue
import licenses for particular areas).
68. See DIWAN & SHABAN, supra note 42, at 5 (explaining that Palestinian
workers were permanently displaced by importation of foreign labor for jobs in Is-
rael).
69. See id. at 45-65 (analyzing the detrimental effect of the closure policy on
the Palestinian economy with particular reference to short term economic losses,
impact on the labor market, and damaging the growth prospects of the economy).
70. STEVEN BARNETT ET AL., THE ECONOMY OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZ-
STRIP - RECENT EXPERIENCE, PROSPECTS, AND CHALLENGES TO PRIVATE SECTOR
DEVELOPMENT 3 (1998). Also significant were the substantial fluctuations in un-
employment levels in the Territories.
71. Id. at 3.
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ritories under conditions of political uncertainty and instability."
Second, the closure of the Israeli seaports and airports to Palestinians
further damaged Palestinian exporters who could no longer use these
convenient venues for exporting their products abroad.'" Third, wide-
spread institutional and individual corruption in the Palestinian
Authority, linked, inter alia, to the creation of import monopolies
headed by senior officials of the Authority or their relatives, further
undermined the economic welfare of the local population. 4 Fourth,
72. See Keith C. Molkner, Legal and Structural Hturdles to Achieving Political
Stability and Economic Development in the Palestinian Territories, 19 FOR!)lAM
INT'L L.J. 1419, 1429-49 (1996) (describing legal hurdles to development in the
Territories in the areas of investment, banking and tax law); see also Mel Levine,
Palestinian Economic Progress under the Oslo Agreements, 19 FORDHIAM I NVI
L.J. 1393, 1405-06 (1996); Jack 1. Garvey, Regional Free Trade Dispute Resolu-
tion as Means for Securing the Middle East Peace Process, 47 AM. J. COM P. L.
147, 155-58 (1999); Fidler, supra note 55, at 181-86 (pointing to inadequate legal
infrastructure, trade monopolies, corruption, and human rights abuses as impedi-
ments to development of Palestinian trade). Foreign investors also have been de-
terred by periodic closures. See id. at 165-66. See generally David P. Fidler, For-
eign Investment in Palestine: An Analysis of the Law on the Encouragement o/
hvestment in Palestine, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 529 (1995) (explaining the effect
of the Palestinian investment law on foreign investment in the context of the over-
all search for peace).
73. See Fidler, supra note 55, at 164-65 (arguing that Palestinian trade would
be subject to Israeli security measures until the Palestinians have their own points
of entry). In addition, as the Gaza Strip and the West Bank are separated by Israeli
territory, closures also meant a significant disruption of trade between the two re-
gions. See id.; see also Ziai, supra note 61, at 141-44 (finding that the arbitrary de-
nial and restrictions on permits, closures, and the lack of an international airport or
port facility significantly increases the costs of trade).
74. See, e.g., Daniel Klaidman & Matt Rees, Something Rotten in Palestine,
NEWSWEEK, May 29, 2000 (reporting that "[a] Newsweek investigation reveals
abuses at almost every level of the Palestinian Authority and quoting a West Bank
resident as saying that "[t]he Authority is like the 40 thieves and Arafat is Ali
Baba"); Ronnen Bergman, The Man who Swallowed Gaza, HA'ARETZ (Mussaf),
April 4, 1997, at 18 (reporting on monopolies governed by senior Palestinian offi-
cials and their cronies); Dani Rubinstein, Festivities in the Palestinian Authority
on the Sources of Corruption, HA'ARETZ, Nov. 3, 1999; Amira Hess, Corruption
under the Aegis of the Process, HA'ARETZ, Oct. 13, 1999; David Hirst, Shameless
in Gaza, THE GUARDIAN, April 21, 1997, at T8 (describing rampant corruption
within the Palestinian National Authority since the organization took control after
the Oslo Accords); Dani Rubinstein, Corruption and Other Malfinctions The
Growth of Public Criticism over Arafat's Rule, HA'ARETZ, September 16, 1996;
Peter Hirschberg, Playing Monopoly, JERUSALEM REPORT, Feb. 22, 1996, at 14.
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the Palestinian Authority designed a series of measures to limit the
scope of operations of Israeli firms and manufacturers in the Territo-
ries - such as limits on registration, rules requiring marketing
through a single authorized (Palestinian) dealer, and local ownership
requirements with respect to joint ventures - which have undermined
further the idea of a customs union between the parties to the Paris
Protocol." Finally, various difficulties concerning the operation of
the mechanism for clearance of revenues between Israel and the Pal-
estinian Authority caused significant losses to the Palestinian
Authority. 6 This mechanism also has been used by the Israeli gov-
ernment to pressure the Palestinian Authority into cracking down
harder on Islamic terrorism." The combination of all of these factors
has led to the prolongation and intensification of the economic crisis
in the Territories. The promised dividends of peace were nowhere to
be seen.
II. SEPARATION VERSUS INTEGRATION: IT'S
NOT ONLY THE ECONOMY, STUPID!
Economic considerations have always played an important role in
shaping the relations between Israelis and Palestinians. "" Yet, in the
Middle East, political, social, and cultural considerations overshadow
economic arguments and calculations. As Seev Hirsch so poignantly
notes, "[e]conomic constraints may limit the capacity of the parties
See also Talia Einhom, The Customs Union between Israel and the Palestinian
Authority: A CriticalAnalysis, 14 BAR-ILAN L. STUD. 439, 444-47 (1998) (arguing
for the need to establish competition rules to counter anticompetitive behavior on
the part of the Palestinian Authority); Fidler, supra note 55, at 183-85 (discussing
the corruption of the Palestinian Authority and its attempts to monopolize sectors
of the economy).
75. Federation of Israeli Chambers of Commerce, supra note 18, at 2.
76. See infra notes 242-258 and the accompanying text (discussing the issue of
revenue clearance in the years following the signing of the Paris Protocol).
77. See, e.g., UNSCO, Closure, supra note 61 (describing the Israeli govern-
ment's decision, following a series of terrorist attacks in 1997, to unilaterally stop
all revenue transfers to the Palestinian Authority until the Authority pursued
stricter measures against Palestinian terrorists).
78. See, e.g., YUVAL ELIZUR, LOHAMAH KALKALIT : MEAH SHENOT IMLT
KALKALI BEN YEHUDIM LE-ARVIM [ECONOMIC WARFARE: THE HUNDRED-YEAR
ECONOMIC CONFRONTATION BETWEEN JEWS AND ARABS] (1997).
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to wage war against each other; they are unlikely to move them to-
wards peace., 79 Thus, the choice among the variety of possible eco-
nomic scenarios to be implemented in the framework of a political
permanent peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians is
not purely, nor even mainly, one shaped by economic considera-
tions." Political, social, cultural, and security considerations are pre-
dominant in national decision-makers' calculi over economic consid-
erations. At the same time, economics should be considered and the
economic implications of going down one route or another must be
openly and boldly recognized and addressed.
Neo-classical international trade theory promotes the view that the
freer is the international trade, the greater is the economic welfare of
all trading partners." Yet, in practice, not a single country exercises a
trade policy fully committed to a pure form of free, uninterrupted
trade. This gap between trade theory and political reality is, of
course, well known and analyzed. To a certain extent, such a disso-
nance results from an inherent tension between the economic bene-
fits accruing to countries exercising free trade and the costs inflicted
upon them, measured, inter alia, in the currency of "sovereignty"
and "independence." The argument waged between those who pro-
mote the cause of economic integration in the Middle East and the
proponents of economic separation between Israelis and Palestinians
reflects, to a large extent, this duality. Whereas most of the argu-
ments in favor of separation are couched in political terms and evoke
issues of national sovereignty and independence, advocates of inte-
gration resort, first and foremost, to economic arguments based on
the perceived advantages derived from trade liberalization. The main
79. Seev Hirsch, Trade Regimes in the Middle East, in ECONOMIC
COOPERATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST 269 (Gideon Fishelson ed., 1989) (describing
the difficulties involved in analyzing trade regimes and stating that political condi-
tions take precedence over economic considerations).
80. See, e.g., ARNON, supra note 22, at 3 (quoting the report of the Bruno
Committee of 1967, which states that "[e]ven an economist who approves of
[complete integration of the administered territories into the Israeli economy] in
the long run, on economic grounds-and these are not obvious-will admit that
the economic considerations are secondary in this context."); Hirsch, supra note
79, at 269.
81. See infra notes 108-110 and accompanying text (discussing the economic
benefits of free trade).
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problem in finding the point of equilibrium results from the different
levels on which the two conversations are conducted. Searching for a
common ground on which to evaluate the different arguments and
balance the relevant competing interests is, therefore, one of the cru-
cial tasks for peace brokers and negotiators.
This part of the Article seeks to explore the tension between eco-
nomic and political considerations in structuring a viable economic
model as part of a permanent peace agreement between Israelis and
Palestinians. Particularly, it analyzes the considerations influencing
the selection between complete separation and a model of economic
integration and shows that an integrationist model is preferable to
complete separation.
A. INTEGRATION SEEMS TO BE THE HARDEST WORD
1. Separate and Equal: A View fiom Palestine
Sovereignty and independence arguments carry particular force in
the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where one party strug-
gles to obtain its political independence from the rule of, and military
occupation by, the other. Under such circumstances, it is not sur-
prising that the Palestinians are willing to pay a high premium for the
right to emphasize and exercise their independence from Israel. Tan-
gible expressions of such independence, such as a flag, national an-
them, stamps, passports, an airport and seaport, and a physical bor-
der, are of special significance. Giving any of them up is not to be
taken lightly, even for the sake of a potential long-term increase in
economic welfare. - This is particularly true in light of the fact that
the Palestinians do not have their own independent state, but rather a
state-to-be. Symbols tend to be infused with special meaning and
82. See ELIAS T. GHANTUS, ARAB INDUSTRIAL INTEGRATION 19-20 (1982)
(noting that the "national consciousness [of developing countries] is high and eco-
nomic development to them is a post-independence endeavor"). See also Nathan
Sussman, Trade Agreement as a Part of Peace ,.lgreentents .4l Historical Per-
spective, 41 ECON. Q. 630, 635-49 (1994) (discussing the economic costs incurred
by the Republic of Ireland from the isolationist trade policy it adopted until the
early 1960s resulting, among other things, from desire to minimize trade relations
with the United Kingdom, its former occupying power).
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significance at such a formative stage of the national ethos."; Denial
of such symbols is almost certain to be rejected and opposed. When
the reason for such denial is perceived to be the recent foreign occu-
pying power, resistance will likely intensify.
In addition, one cannot be oblivious to the Palestinian fear of re-
placing Israeli military imperialism with an economic form of subju-
gation and domination given the vast differences in economic power,
development level, structure, and size between the two economies." '
To paraphrase Von Clausewitz's famous comment on the relation-
ship between war and politics, economic integration may be consid-
ered as the continuation of military occupation and rule by other
means." Indeed, it has been argued that economic interdependence
has increased the power of economically powerful, industrial nations.
Economic interdependence, it is argued, enables powerful countries
to expand the scope of state regulation and extend it far beyond their
territorial boundaries, thus increasing their regional and global influ-
ence.86 The vast economic differences between the Israeli and Pales-
83. GHANTUS, supra note 82, at 19-20 (explaining the importance of national
symbols in the formative states of national development). See also Lee Hockstader,
Palestinians Open Gaza Airport; A Proud Sign of Sovereignty, Despite Israeli
Presence, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 1998, at Al (quoting a Palestinian Airlines
ground attendant as saying "[f]inally we have our airport, and this is the most im-
portant day in our hopes to be a state"); Kleiman, supra note 48, at 351 (noting,
with respect to the Paris Protocol, that: "precisely because the DOP stopped short
of holding out a promise of a sovereign state... the Palestinians were eager for
even the slightest tokens of sovereignty, and for any expression of the separateness
of their new entity from Israel.").
84. See, e.g., Laura Drake, Arab-Israeli Relations in a New MIiddle East Order
- The politics of economic cooperation, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MIDDLE
EAST PEACE - THE IMPACT OF COMPETING TRADE AGENDAS 11, 17 (J.W. Wright,
Jr. ed., 1999) (quoting Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, who stated the follow-
ing in a 1995: "[e]xplain to me, what is a new Middle East? If it's peace and coop-
eration, that's OK. But people say Israel wants to be the strongest state in the re-
gion and control the economy. Talk like this makes all the countries in the region
afraid."). See also Eliyahu Kanovsky, Marketing the New Middle East,
COMMENTARY, Apr. 1, 1997, at 55, 57; Kleiman, supra note 48, at 351.
85. See Drake, supra note 84, at 22 (suggesting that the asymmetries in levels
of economic development between Israel and its neighbors "are likely to result not
in interdependence but in dependence.").
86. See, e.g., HARRY G. GELBER, SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH INTERDEPENDENCE
(1997).
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tinian economies, as well as the divergent level of realization of na-
tional aspirations between Israelis and Palestinians, cast doubts as to
the viability of economic integration in the Middle Eastern context.
Such political arguments favoring economic separation between
Israelis and Palestinians are further buttressed by certain economic
claims, such as the protection of infant industries, the argument con-
cerning the relationship of exporting labor services to Israel and for-
eign investment in the Territories, and the socio-economic costs of
polarization and unbalanced distribution of benefits resulting from
integration between Israel and the Palestinian state. Even if one con-
ceded that some degree of economic integration between Israel and
Palestine is desirable, it might still be advisable to start the two par-
ties off on a separation track that will converge at some point in the
future. 7 The wide rift between the two economies, especially re-
garding their industrial sectors, may necessitate an initial substantial
degree of separation between them, designed to protect the fledgling
Palestinian industry from being trampled by its far advanced Israeli
counterpart. This protection is necessary, according to this line of ar-
gument, if the local industry is to be able to realize its potential and
take advantage of its unique comparative advantages. The fact that
the low level of industrialization in the Territories is deemed the re-
sult not merely of inadequate local incentives, but also of an inten-
tional Israeli policy to keep the Palestinians under-industrialized, is
often mentioned as a further historical support for this argument."
Indeed, even (the Treaty of) Rome was not built in a day. The
European Union, being the most advanced model of economic inte-
gration to date, resulted from evolutionary growth rather than revo-
lutionary cusps.89 On the political side, the "separation first" argu-
87. See, e.g., Anon & Weinblatt, supra note 16, at 43-44.
88. See supra notes 26-27 and the accompanying text (arguing that the Israeli
government adopted protectionist policies to protect Israeli industry from Pales-
tinian competition).
89. A New Idea for Europe: The Schuman Declaration (visited May 9, 2000)
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgI 0/publications/brochures/docL 50ans/decl_en.html
#declaration> (text of the declaration made by the French Foreign Minister Robert
Schuman on May 9, 1950, expressing the fundamental vision underlying the move
towards gradual economic integration in post-World War II Europe and suggesting
that "Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single, general plan. It
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ment distinguishes between economic arrangements struck between
Israel and Palestine and those struck between the two parties prior to
Palestine gaining independence. Advocates of this approach note the
following: first, it is unlikely that pre-negotiated economic arrange-
ments constraining the Palestinians' sovereignty would be able to
hold sway against the winds of nationalism, sovereignty and inde-
pendence in the newly created state. Violations by the Palestinians of
such pre-set arrangements, which are quite certain to occur, will only
add friction and conflict with Israel. Such arrangements will also be
used by internal domestic opposition to challenge the Palestinian
government as "selling out" to Israel." Second, structuring the eco-
nomic relations between Israelis and Palestinians in the stage pre-
ceding the creation of an independent Palestinian state would lead to
Israel and the peace process taking blame for any socio-economic
difficulties that may occur after independence is declared. 9'
Another economic rationale opposing economic integration points
out the "deleterious effect on investment in the Palestinian territories
and on their economic development" of the employment of Palestin-
ian workers in Israel.92 The level of domestic wages in the Territories
rises as a result of the availability of high-paying jobs in the Israeli
market. As foreign investments are attracted by, inter alia, low
wages, this phenomenon should deter investment and hamper further
economic development in the Territories.93 Indeed, the promise of
free movement of Palestinian workers into Israel in the context of an
economic integration between the two countries is seen by some to
be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, there are the short-term
will be built through concrete achievements, which first create a de facto solidar-
ity.").
90. Yoram Meshar, On the Desirability of Proper Borders between Israel and
the Palestinian Entity: Economic and Politics Overshadowed b', Sociology and
Demographics, 41 ECON. Q. 656, 665 (1994); DAN SCHUEFTAN, KORAH IIA-
HAFRADAH : YISRAEL VEHA-YESHUT HA-PALESTINIT [DISENGAGEMENT - ISRAEL
AND THE PALESTINIAN ENTITY] 110-16 (1999).
91. Meshar, supra note 90, at 665.
92. ARNON, supra note 22, at 20.
93. See id. at 19-20 (commenting that the Territories are underdeveloped and
obtain little foreign investment because the high number of job opportunities
abroad decreases the number of workers in the Territories, thereby raising the
wages of workers and decreasing potential profits for foreign investors).
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benefits to the Palestinian economy of continued export of labor
services to Israel. At the same time there is the fear of the continued
dependency effect that such heavy reliance on work in Israel creates
for the Palestinian economy. Palestinian work in Israel is considered
a tool that Israel can utilize to advance its political and economic
policies at the expense of the Palestinians. ' Even if it is not used by
Israel in this way, the fact that most Palestinians working in Israel
are employed in volatile sectors such as agriculture and construction
makes this significant source of Palestinian GNP particularly prob-
lematic.9 In addition, it is also necessary to address the possibility of
entrenching asymmetrical patterns of development of the two neigh-
boring markets, i.e., the fear that economic integration between Is-
raelis and Palestinians would lead Israel to take advantage of cheap
Palestinian labor without facilitating any significant technological
advancement of the Palestinian economy.
Finally, there are also the arguments concerning the distribution of
benefits between the parties to an integration arrangement. First,
while all countries involved may gain economic benefits, measured
on an aggregate basis, initial economic differences may not be mini-
mized as a result of integration, but rather may be enhanced and ac-
centuated. For example, some domestic regions may feel the brunt of
integration as industries and businesses may prefer other sites. Fur-
thermore, industries and businesses already established in those areas
may choose to relocate elsewhere. It is also quite likely that regions
already economically disadvantaged prior to the integration will be
94. See Developing the Palestinian Econoniiy an Interview with George T.
Abed, 23(4) J. PALESTINE STUD. 41, 43 (1994) (encouraging Palestinian leaders to
implement developmental programs for jobs rather than telling Palestinians to go
to Israel for jobs); Elmusa & El-Jaafari, supra note 43, at 29.
95. See, e.g., Kleiman, supra note 48, at 351 (concluding that the nature of the
Palestinian economy makes it dependant on a highly volatile industry that is out of
its control); Ephraim Kleiman, A Propos the Israel-PLO Economic Agreement, 41
ECON. Q. 678, 680-81 (1994).
96. See, e.g., Sara Roy, Separation or Integration: Closure and the Economic
Future of the Gaza Strip Revisited, 48 MIDDLE EAST J. 11 (1994) (arguing that
through closure of the Territories and a variety of new economic measures de-
signed to mitigate the effects of a decaying economy, Israel's government has not
tried to institutionalize a separation of the Territories and Israel, but rather has pur-
sued a restructured form of integration): Drake, supra note 84, at 24-25.
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the ones most hurt by that economic move.97 Consequently, these
economically disadvantaged regions may experience further non-
linear adverse social and economic effects such as higher crime lev-
els, negative immigration, and so forth. Second, economic integra-
tion between an economically strong party and a much weaker one
may result in the weaker party substituting imports from third coun-
tries with goods imported from the wealthier party to that arrange-
ment, thus resulting in loss of much-needed tariff and import duty
98
revenues.
2. "Good Fences Make Good Neighbors ": ""A View from Israel
From the Israeli perspective, economic considerations also play a
secondary role in deciding the nature of future relations with the Pal-
estinians. The leading role is played by ideological considerations
concerning the political future of the Territories, as well as by na-
tional and personal security considerations. Gaining momentum
during the turbulent years of the Intifada, and spreading rapidly as a
result of the post-Oslo Palestinian terrorist campaign, the idea of
physical separation became the preferred political option for the vast
majority of the Israeli public.' °° A catchy slogan used by the Barak
campaign during the 1999 Israeli elections stated simply "Anakhnu
97. See PETER ROBSON, THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION
239-42 (4th ed. 1998) (illustrating the phenomenon of perpetuation of initial eco-
nomic differences among regions as a result of the free flow of trade and factors of
production, known as polarization or backwash).
98. However, the weight of this argument is limited due to the fact that at pres-
ent most goods imported into the Territories come from Israel. See supra note 42
and accompanying text.
99. FROST, supra note 3, at 48. The adage "good fences make good neighbors"
is often quoted by Prime Minister Barak. See Weymouth, supra note 2.
100. See supra note 12 and the accompanying text (discussing the Intida and
the terrorist activities associated with it). The view that separation was crucial to
their personal security has thus become widely shared among Israelis. See SHILOMO
BEN AMI, MAKOM LE-KHULAM [A PLACE FOR EvERYONE] 106-10 (1998);
SCHUEFTAN, supra note 90, at 54-58. But see West Bank and Gaza. The Banging
Door, ECONOMIST, Aug. 3, 1996, at 39 (noting the Likud party's opposition to
"separation" and its disbelief that restricting border access constitutes an effective
security measure).
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Kan, Hem Sham," or "Us Here, Them There."'' At minimum, it was
argued, eradicating the long-standing hostility and animosity be-
tween Israelis and Palestinians could not be accomplished overnight.
Hence, a preliminary stage of separating the former enemies and re-
ducing potential frictions is needed before any further step towards
integration can be taken..0 2
From the economic perspective, the substantial size differentials
between the Israeli and the Palestinian economies, the differences in
their level of development, and the relatively negligible exports to,
and imports from, the Territories, minimize the implications for the
Israeli economy of economic separation or integration with the Pal-
estinians.' 3 The purchasing power of the small Palestinian economy
101. See Matt Rees, Israel's Stance Becomes Clear as Barak Calls Jbr Separa-
tion, THE SCOTSMAN, Aug. 19, 1999, at 12 (discussing Barak's belief that peace
can only be achieved through a separatist approach).
102. See, e.g., Meshar, supra note 90, at 666.
103. See Eli Sagi & Yaacov Sheinin, The Chances for Trade with the Arab
Countries, 41 EcON. Q. 15, 21 (1994). Palestinian exports to Israel constitute less
than 1 percent of the aggregate Israeli import market. At first glance it seems that
the Palestinian market constitutes an important target market for Israeli exports,
second in importance only to the American and European markets. However, sev-
eral factors modify this picture. First, one should discount the indirect importation
by residents of the Territories, i.e., import of goods from third countries via the Is-
raeli seaports and airports. The value added to the Israeli economy with respect to
such goods in transit is relatively small. Second, another portion of Israeli exports
to the Territories is comprised of the sale of used durable goods by Israelis to Pal-
estinians. Third, a significant portion of Israeli exports to the Territories involves
subcontracting activities in the Territories for Israeli plants and factories. Such
factories would send materials and unfinished inputs to the Territories where the
final product is manufactured for the Israeli manufacturer. Fourth, the data in-
cludes Palestinian consumption in Israel proper. such as the purchase of cigarettes
and food by Palestinian workers employed in Israel. Finally, while Israel has
maintained a trade surplus in its relations with the Territories, this trade is, in fact,
internal, as it has been carried out in Israeli currency, thus not much improving Is-
rael's foreign trade balance. See id. In the discussion above I have specifically
avoided adding into the economic calculation the thorny question of management
of the scant water resources in the region and the arrangements concerning the
sharing and use of these water resources, albeit a significant potential trade issue
upon Israel's withdrawal from the Territories. See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti, Collective
Action in the Utilization of Shared Freshwater: The Challenges of International
Water Resources Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 384 (1996) (exploring the relationship
and contributions of international law to water resources issues, and the problems
associated with management of those resources); Eyal Benvenisti & Haim Gvirtz-
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and the nature of Israel's technologically advanced market, which
specializes in producing and exporting products for high-income
consumers in developed countries, reduce further the economic sig-
nificance of the Palestinian market for the Israeli manufacturers.14
The political case against economic integration is often buttressed
by economic arguments raised by powerful interest groups, such as
the agricultural sector, that in the past enjoyed varying degrees of
protection against Palestinian competition, and that fear exposure to
such competition in the future.' Other economic considerations take
into account the potential use of the Territories to circumvent Israel's
import regime and trade and environmental policies, as well as the
use of the Palestinian state to provide tax shelters for Israeli citizens
and nationals. 06 There are also fears that integration will permit the
man, Harnessing International Law to Determine Israeli-Palestinian Water Rights.
33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 543 (1993) (discussing the peace talks with relation to the
conflict over the region's scarce water resources and noting that a peace agreement
will have to include an arrangement concerning the utilization and conservation of
water).
104. See Israel and the Arab World, Little Becomes Even Less, THii
ECONOMIST, Apr. 5, 1997, at 42 (estimating that "growth in regional trade would
not add more than 1 percent to Israel's overall export volume"); MARK A. HELLER,
A PALESTINIAN STATE- THE IMPLICATIONS FOR ISRAEL 127 (1983) (arguing that
closing trade with the Territories would have little effect on Israeli markets be-
cause Israel has a trade surplus with them and because trade was carried out in Is-
raeli currency); Sagi & Sheinin, supra note 103 (arguing that direct trade relations
between Israel and Arab nations are not likely to be economically significant due
to the small addition of the Arab markets to existing target markets for Israeli ex-
ports as well as the fact that the Arab countries are relatively poor and their import
patterns and needs do not meet Israeli exports and comparative advantage. The
authors arrive at similar conclusions with respect to imports to Israel).
105. See Kleiman, supra note 48, at 352 (claiming that competition between Is-
raeli and Palestinian farmers could cause economic hardship within the Israeli ag-
ricultural sector); see also infra note 134 and the accompanying text (noting that
Palestinians are generally employed in low-skilled, low-paid, manual labor jobs);
HELLER, supra note 104, at 127 (noting that less sophisticated Israeli industries
may suffer some losses from competition with Palestinian producers). But see id. at
126-31 (emphasizing that the relatively small weight of Palestinian trade in the
overall Israeli international trade, as well as the fact that the Israeli and Palestinian
economies are, by and large, complementary rather than competing, weaken the
impact of such arguments as far as the Israeli economy as a whole is concerned).
106. See Kleiman, supra note 48, at 352; Ora Koren, Supervision over the
Transfer of Goodsfiom the Territories into Israel to be Tightened, I-IA'ARETZ, Feb.
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use of the Territories to bypass Israel's immigration policy and Is-
rael's ability to monitor those who wish to enter its borders.'"'
B. SEPARATION ANXIETY
In as much as regional economic integration is thought of in terms
of trade liberalization among the trading partners and a potential for
international trade playing an enhanced role in the local economy,
the benefits resulting from such integration are explained, primarily,
in economic terms. These derive from neo-classical, liberal theories
of international trade rooted in the Ricardian notion of comparative
advantage,08 which explains that free trade leads to specialization in
production coupled with the exchange of goods and services. Each
country ought to specialize in the production of those goods and
services that it most efficiently produces, i.e., with respect to which it
enjoys a comparative advantage to other countries. International
trade allows countries to so specialize and then exchange goods and
services, rather than produce everything at home, thus resulting in a
more efficient allocation of resources, and creating a rise in global
welfare.1' 9 Free trade encourages economic growth and the creation
of greater wealth for all the countries involved. It increases the
24, 2000 (reporting a decision by the Israeli government's Ministerial Committee
on Intellectual Property to tighten the supervision over the transfer of goods from
the Territories into Israel, in order to minimize the smuggling into Israel of coun-
terfeit goods).
107. Einat Fishbein, Police: Thousands of Illegal Wiorkers from iVarious Coun-
tries enter Israel through the Palestinian Authority 's controlled areas, HA'ARETZ,
Feb. 24, 2000.
108. See, e.g., PETER H. LINDERT & THOMAS A. PUGEL, INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMICS 33-36 (10th ed. 1996) (illustrating the concept of comparative advan-
tage); see also Alan 0. Sykes, Comparative Advantage and the Normative Eco-
nomics of International Trade Policy, 1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 49 (1998) (examining
comparative advantage as the "engine of trade").
109. See LINDERT & PUGEL, supra note 108, at 28 (quoting ADAM SMITH, TilE
WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776)). Smith stated that:
What is prudence in the conduct of every private family, can scarcely be folly
in that of a great kingdom. If a foreign country can supply us with a com-
modity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better buy it of them with
some part of the product of our own industry.
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amount and variety of goods and services available to consumers
world-wide and accelerates the diffusion of knowledge and innova-
tion."° Its economic advantages are dynamic as well as static.
Furthermore, a link is often argued to exist between international
trade, economic development, and democracy."' Economic growth
and development are considered linked to liberalization of trade and
participation in the global markets."' At the same time, it is fre-
quently argued that higher levels of economic development and eco-
nomic growth are closely linked to the democratic nature of the rele-
vant polity."3 This perceived link is of particular significance in the
110. See, e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati, Is Free Trade Pass6 After All?, 125
WELTWIRTSCHAFTLICHES ARCHIV 17 (1989), reprinted in POLITICAL ECONOMY
AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 3 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Douglas A. Irwin eds.,
1991) (discussing the doctrine of free trade and several theories that challenge the
system).
I 11. See, e.g., Alberto Costi, The Use of Free Trade Instruments in the Transi-
tion Process of Central and Eastern Europe: Success or Failure? (forthcoming
2000).
112. See, e.g., Dan Ben-David et al., Trade, Income Disparity and Poverty 32-36
(WTO Special Studies 5, June 2000) (discussing the relationship between trade
openness and economic growth).
113. See, e.g., Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Maintaining International Peace and Se-
curity: The United Nations as Forum and Focal Point, 16 Loy. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 1, 2 (1993) ("Promotion of peace and security, economic and social de-
velopment, and democracy are one and the same."); Donald K. Emmerson, Ameri-
canizing Asia?, FOREIGN AFF., May/June 1998, at 46 (discussing the debate con-
cerning the existence of a link between democratic governance and robust
economic growth); Alan S. Greenspan, Thoughts About the Transitioning Market
Economies of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, 6 DEPAUL BUS. L.J.
1, 13-14 (1993) (discussing that free markets support the growth of democracy);
Adam Przeworski et al., What Makes Democracies Endure?, 7 J. DEMOCRACY 39
(1996) (analyzing different countries between 1950 and 1990 and concluding that
the level of economic development directly affects the survival chances of democ-
racies, and that among moderate-income and poor countries, democracy has a
much higher chance of surviving if there is a strong economic growth); Seymour
Martin Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and
Political Legitimacy, 52 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69 (1959) (suggesting that "the more
well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy");
Seymour Martin Lipset, The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited, 59 AM.
SOC. REV. 1 (1994). This approach is not shared by all. See, e.g., Fareed Zakaria,
Democratic Tyranny, 25 PROSPECT 20 (1997) (emergence of "illiberal democra-
cies" in developing countries where political leaders argue for the need for sweep-
ing, "illiberal" governmental powers in order to ensure economic liberalization.).
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context of conflict resolution and international reconciliation for two
main reasons. First, there is the long recognized inherent relationship
between trade and peace. In his To Perpetual Peace, Immanuel Kant
argues that "the spirit of trade cannot coexist with war.""" Those be-
lieving in the existence of a close link between free trade and democ-
racy may seek to buttress this argument by adding observations about
"democratic peace," i.e., that democratic regimes have a low propen-
sity to go to war (or, according to some, do not at all go to war)
114. Immanuel Kant, To Perpetual Peace: .4 Philosophical Sketch. in
PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYS 107, 125 (Ted Humphrey trans., 1983)
(1795). Kant proceeds to state that "sooner or later this spirit dominates every peo-
ple. For among all those powers (or means) that belong to a nation, financial power
may be the most reliable in forcing nations to pursue the noble cause of peace..."
Id. See also Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Alairs, 12
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205 and 323 (1983) (arguing that liberal economies tend less to
wage wars compared with non-liberal economies); CHARLES COVELL, KANT AND
THE LAW OF PEACE - A STUDY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAWv AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 160-61 (1998) (discussing Kant's identification of
cosmopolitan law, the law of peace, with law "pertaining to trade and commerce");
ROBERT GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 56
(1987) ("[Liberals take the view that] the mutual benefits of trade and the expand-
ing web of interdependence among national economies tend to foster cooperative
relations ... Trade and economic interdependence create bonds of mutual interest
and a vested interest in international peace and thus have a moderating influence
on international relations."); JOHN STUART MILL, Principles al'Political Economy,
in 3 COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 594 (John M. Robson ed., 1965)
(noting that trade is "the principal guarantee of the peace of the world"); CHARLES
LOUIS MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 338 (A. Cohler et al. trans., 1989)
("The natural effect of commerce is to lead to peace."); Philip N1. Nichols, Regu-
lating Transnational Briber, in Times of Globalization and Fragmentation, 24
YALE J. INT'L L. 257, 263 (1999). But see Mark Duffield, Geographi and the
Boundaries of Confidence: Globalization and I1'ar Economies: Promoting Order
or the Return of History?, 23 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 21 (1999) (noting the
"paradox of globalization"). Duffield explains that "despite the predominance of
neo-liberal assumptions that market reform will promote growth and order, we are
daily confronted with setbacks and evidence of instability." Ud. at 21. He argues
that "rather than promoting stability, globalization has helped illiberal and quasi-
feudal forms of political economy to expand." Id. Against the liberal interpretation
of globalization he poses the "durable disorder" interpretation of globalization,
namely "the forces of globalization often produce unexpected and unwanted out-
comes as they encounter other social systems. Rather than the anticipated virtuous
circles of growth and prosperity that lead to orderliness, globalization tends to en-
courage new and durable forms of division, inequality and instability." Id. at 22.
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against each other.' 5 Following this line of argumentation, trade and
growth stand in an inverse relationship to war.'1 6 Empirical studies,
which show that growth in direct trade between countries stands in
inverse relation to their propensity to fight each other, establish an
even more direct link between trade and peace. The more that par-
ticular countries trade with each other, the less likely they are to con-
duct armed hostile acts against each other. ' 7 To the extent that eco-
nomic integration is seen to be trade enhancing between the countries
taking part in such integration, it lowers the risk of the eruption of
violence in the relevant region."8
A second, another important link frequently made in the context of
the Arab-Israeli conflict is the inverse relation perceived to exist
between rising standards of living and the turn to religious funda-
mentalism." 9 Economic prosperity is considered an important
115. See, e.g., PATHS TO PEACE: IS DEMOCRACY THE ANSWER? (Miriam F. El-
man ed., 1997) (providing case studies of the democratic peace hypothesis);
BRUCE RUSSETT, GRASPING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE: PRINCIPLES FOR A POST-
COLD WAR WORLD (1993) (establishing the democratic peace theory); Anne-
Marie Slaughter et al., International Law and International Relations Theory: A
New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 367, 382-83
(1998) (providing context for the democratic peace theory in liberal international
relations theory). See generally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE
TREE 195-98 (1999) (referring to a globalized "McDonald's" world with a "Golden
Arches Theory of Conflict Avoidance").
116. See, e.g., EDWARD D. MANSFIELD, POWER, TRADE, AND WAR 233 (1994)
(discussing the inverse relationship between economic growth and conflict);
WILLIAM H. MOTT IV, THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF PEACE - LINKAGES BETWEEN
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 193-229 (1997) (arguing that
whereas static economic growth, which is based on accumulation of existing re-
sources, favors conflict, economic dynamic growth, which is based on knowledge
and innovation, inhibits conflict).
117. See, e.g., Solomon W. Polachek, Conflict and Trade, 24 J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 55 (1980) (analyzing data for 30 countries between 1958 and 1967, show-
ing that doubling the volume of trade between two countries results in a 20 percent
decline in the incidence and frequency of armed hostilities between them).
118. See, e.g., WILLEM MOLLE, THE ECONOMICS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION:
THEORY, PRACTICE, POLICY 8 (3d ed. 1997) ("Economic integration is not an ob-
jective in itself, but serves higher objectives, both of an economic and of a political
nature .... When countries become dependent upon each other as a result of eco-
nomic integration this reduces the chance of armed conflicts between them.").
119. See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS, PEACE, AND LAUGI ITER 3-4
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weapon in the fight against terrorist organizations, such as the Hamas
movement, that cultivate support for their actions and recruit active
cadre on the basis of the appeal of religious fundamentalism to the
socially and economically disenfranchised.':"
The economic hardships that are likely to plague the Palestinian
economy - should it separate from its Israeli counterpart - and the
destructive effects that such economic decline may have on the
maintenance of long-lasting peace in the region are the main argu-
ments marshaled by opponents of economic separation."' The equa-
tion of higher standards of living with lower levels of violence is the
battle cry of those supporting ongoing integration.I- Given the Ter-
ritories' substantial economic reliance on exporting labor services to
Israel since 1967,'2" it is argued that complete separation will have
disastrous implications for the Palestinian economy, due to the in-
(1971) (noting that "among the poor, only religion, with its promise of a later mu-
nificence for those who endure privation with patience, has been competitive with
economic circumstance in shaping social attitudes"); see also Kleiman, supra note
48, at 352 (arguing that a rise in the standard of living in the Gaza Strip and the
West Bank is a means to combat the rise of Islamic fundamentalism); PERES, supra
note 1, at 72 (characterizing poverty as "[t]he father of fundamentalism"); Rabin
Address, supra note 10 ("Israel is interested that the Palestinians in Gaza will en-
tertain better economic and social conditions, because poverty is a fertile ground
for the growth of the HAMAS and the Islamic Jihad.").
120. See SCHIFF & YAARI, supra note 52, at 22245 (1990) ("when all the doors
are shut, the doors of Allah open") (quoting Sheikh Ahmad Yassin of Gaza, the
powerful spiritual leader of the Hamas movement. Id. at 229).
121. Whereas the arguments discussed in this section of the Article focus po-
marily on the macro-economic level, others have tried to support the cause of free
trade between Israelis and Palestinians also on the basis of micro-economic analy-
sis. See Ezra Sadan, Free Trade beitween Israel and the Palestinian Erport Inhs-
tries, 41 ECON. Q. 5, 9-13 (1994).
122. Recently, that equation is garnering some support also among the Pales-
tinians. See Klaidman & Rees, supra note 13 (quoting a Palestinian legislator who
stated that "[sleparation is very bad for us .... Separation will force the people to
revolution again."); see also Danna Harman, Separation has downside. Berger
tells Ben-And, THE JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 31, 1999. at 3 (quoting Yasser Abed
Rabbo, the Palestinian Information Minister and head of the Palestinian final-status
agreement negotiating team, as saying that "I am against separation. We want open
borders.").
123. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text (noting that there are a sig-
nificant number of Palestinian laborers in Israel, both permit holders and non-
permit holders).
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ability of Palestinians to export labor services to Israel. 24 As wit-
nessed during the Intifada, and under the Israeli government's clo-
sure policy in the years immediately following the signing of the
Paris Protocol and the Interim Agreement, separating Palestinian
workers from the Israeli workplace has dealt a critical blow to the
Palestinian economy.' 5 In fact, Gazans were far worse off than the
residents of the West Bank because sealing off the Gaza Strip was an
easier task to perform than blocking entry into Israel from the West
Bank.'26 The rapid economic decline in Gaza is therefore quite telling
when economic separation is considered. Palestinians previously
employed in Israel were unable to replace their lost positions either
in the local labor market or in other countries in the region. This state
of affairs is unlikely to change in the near future,' given the small
size of the regional economies 2 ' and political concerns, such as fear
of destabilizing the fragile power structure in Jordan. There are also
grudges and mistrust going back to the Gulf War, during which the
Palestinians enthusiastically supported the Iraqi regime.'29 High un-
employment rates and a decline in the standard of living in the Ter-
ritories came to represent aspects of the resulting economic stagna-
tion and depression that hit a population already suffering a
124. But see ARNON, supra note 22, at 45 (asserting that "long-run considera-
tions call for a gradual decrease of Palestinian employment in Israel ... We may
therefore expect the peace era to generate a mechanism that produces a gradual
phasing out of Palestinian labor activity in the Israeli economy").
125. See supra notes 49-50, 68-70 and accompanying text (remarking that after
December 1987, movement towards separation between the Palestinian and Israeli
markets led to a decline in Palestinian laborers employed in Israel).
126. See, e.g., supra note 46 and accompanying graph. Pre the 1994 closures,
the percentage of Palestinians working in Israel out of the overall Palestinian
workforce was higher for the Gaza Strip than for the West Bank. With the imposi-
tion of closures, this trend has reversed. See Anon & Weinblatt, supra note 16, at
40 (noting this trend reversal).
127. GAZIT, supra note 22, at 270.
128. Richard B. Freeman et al., Palestinian-Israeli-Jordanian Labor Mobility:
The Current Situation and Issues for a Peaceful Future, in SECURING PEACE IN Till'
MIDDLE EAST 69 (Stanley Fischer et al. eds., 1994).
129. DIWAN & SHABAN, supra note 42, at 4 (discussing the elimination of Jor-
dan and the Gulf market as potential sources for demand for Palestinian labor). See
also Wright, supra note 19, at 52-53 (noting the localization of the labor forces in
the Gulf states as a response to the fast growth rate of their labor forces).
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substantial economic hardship.';" As experience clearly demonstrates,
the burden of such labor dislocation fell disproportionately on the
shoulders of unskilled and semi-skilled Palestinian laborers who, by
and large, constituted the major portion of workers employed in the
Israeli market. 3' The potential disruption of class relations within the
Palestinian society may well have substantial ramifications not only
as far as domestic politics in the Palestinian state is concerned, but
also vis-A-vis that state's continued peaceful relations with Israel.":
From an Israeli perspective, the barring of Palestinian workers
from entering Israel and working there is also not cost-free. The
number of Palestinians working in Israel has always been small
compared with the overall size of the Israeli workforce. At its high-
est, the number of Palestinian workers in Israel did not exceed seven
percent of the Israeli workforce." However, since 1967 certain sec-
tors utilizing low skilled, low paid, manual labor, such as the con-
struction industry and agriculture, came to rely heavily on Palestinian
labor."' Israeli employers, pressured to find replacements for Pales-
130. See Gross & Sagi, supra note 45, at 58 (arguing that although the level of
unemployment in both the Gaza Strip and the West bank has stabilized in recent
years, a major factor in this context is the explosion in the number of jobs created
in the civil service and public sector of the Territories, and suggesting that this
trend is coming to an end); see also DIWAN & SHABAN, supra note 42, at 117-18
(noting the rapid expansion in public sector employment under the Palestinian
Authority and expressing concern that: "extra recruitment has already met the level
needed to fulfill public sector functions under a market economy blue-print ...
Continued recruitment at the same pace as in recent past could threaten medium-
term fiscal stability. It could compromise the PA's ability to provide adequate ...
service ...").
131. See, e.g., DIvAN & SHABAN, supra note 42, at 4 (discussing in general "'the
rapid drop in demand for existing unskilled Palestinians workers in Israel ...
which have affected various segments of the labor market differently").
132. See HELLER, supra note 104, at 86-87 (analyzing economic problems that
could arise out of the establishment of the Palestinian state).
133. See ARNON, supra note 22, at 83 (noting further that Palestinian laborers in
Israel are "concentrated in a small number of industries").
134. See id. (noting that in 1991, close to 68,000 Palestinians were employed in
the construction industry in Israel compared to approximately 96,000 Israelis). A
similar trend was noted in the agricultural sector. As a result, '[Israeli c]ontructors
and farmers... became a lobby for maintaining the employment of Palestinian
workers in the face of security problems." Id. See also B'Tselem, supra note 46, at
11-13.
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tinian workers, turned to importing foreign workers from low-wage
countries. Within two years, starting in February 1994, the number of
foreign workers employed in Israel jumped from around 10,000 to
some 200,000. 35 Unlike Palestinian workers who live with their
families in the Territories and commute to work in Israel on a daily
basis, foreign workers reside within Israel, frequently bringing fam-
ily members with them.' This has caused severe social problems,
including the lack of adequate legal and social protection for such
workers and their families. This led, in turn, to exploitation and a
concomitant moral corruption of the Israeli society.
Market access of Palestinian goods and services to Israel consti-
tutes another important factor favoring economic integration. As em-
phasized above, since 1967, trade relations between Israel and the
Territories have been far from balanced, with the Palestinian econ-
omy dependent on the Israeli market both for its exports and im-
ports.3 7 The Israeli market remains the natural target market for Pal-
estinian exports and the obvious source for imports into the
Territories.' This is due to the physical proximity of the two mar-
kets, the de facto integration of their infrastructure, and the wide
economic difference between them. Physical proximity is especially
135. See ARNON, supra note 22, at 8 (stating that one of the factors making it
easier for the Israeli economy to remain strong during 1994, when it closed its bor-
ders to the Territories, was the substantial migration of foreign workers to Israel).
See also Kav La'Oved, Newsletter, May 2000 (on file with the author) (Kav
La'Oved (Workers' Hotline), an Israeli non-profit organization focusing on the
protection of the rights of workers in Israel, estimates that as of May 2000 there
were some 211,000 foreign, non-Palestinian, workers employed in Israel of which
141,000 were without working permits).
136. See Ruth Ben Israel, On Social Human Rights for Workers of the Adminis-
tered Areas, 12 ISRAEL Y.B. HUM. RTS. 141, 141 (1982) (noting the distinction
between the situation of an ordinary migrant worker and that of a Palestinian
worker).
137. See supra Part I.B. (commenting that the Territories rely heavily on Israel
both for exports and imports).
138. See Oren Gross & Eli Sagi, Regional Trade Arrangements in the Service of
Peace in the Middle East, in REGIONAL COOPERATION IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT (R.
Bar-El et al eds., forthcoming 2000) (on file with the author); Amir H. Khoury,
International Trade and Commerce: A Bridge for the Israeli-Palestinian Peace, 7
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1I, 27-28 (1999) (listing several reasons why the
Israeli market is the target of Palestinian trade).
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crucial for trade in fresh agricultural produce, and is responsible for
much of the subcontracting activities that developed in the Territo-
ries since 1967.'"9 Both are staples of the economy in the Territo-
ries.'O Proximity also means relatively low, if not negligible, trans-
portation costs. Shared infrastructure, including roads, electrical
power grids, and water supplies, emphasizes the nature of the Israeli-
Palestinian economic relationship even further.
The vast economic differences between the Israeli and Palestinian
markets present significant opportunity for Palestinian manufactur-
ers. Enjoying comparative advantage in the production of low-
technology, labor-intensive products, they can produce and supply
goods and services aimed at the relatively large market of lower in-
come Israeli households.'41 The same advantages do not hold true for
Palestinian manufacturers and service suppliers seeking to compete
in other regional markets.
First, they will compete against local manufacturers and service
suppliers who frequently enjoy lower costs of production and require
139. See Elmusa & El-Jaafari, supra note 43. at 27 (noting the disadvantaged
position of Palestinian produce in regional markets due to higher production costs);
see also Hisham Awartani & Ephraim Kleiman, Economic Interactions .. niong
Participants in the Middle East Peace Process. 51 MIDDLE EAST J. 215, 217, 222
(1997) (suggesting that although trade patterns of Arab states show a weak ten-
dency for intra-regional trade among themselves, the geographical proximity of the
Israeli, Palestinian, and Jordanian markets presents the potential for substantial
border-type trade, as well as joint ventures); see also Arie Anon & Jimmy Wein-
blatt, Potential Trade Flows between Israel, Jordan. and the Palestinian Econony,
41 ECON. Q. 574 (1994); Nadav Halevi, Trade Relations between Israel and Jor-
dan in Light of the Agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, 41 ECON. Q.
611 (1994). But see Sagi & Sheinin, supra note 103, at 20-23.
140. See Antoine Mansour & B. Destremau, Palestine and Israel: Subcontract-
ing Relations in the Garment Industri, 41 (1997) (discussing the relative impor-
tance of sub-contracting activity in the Territories, mainly in the context of cloth-
ing manufacturing); GAZIT, supra note 23, at 252 (the development of sub-
contracting activity in the Territories, mainly in the context of clothes manufac-
turing); see also Vernon, supra note 33, at 60-61: Clothes 'Made in Israel' sewn in
West Bank, THE TORONTO STAR, May 18, 1992, at B4.
141. See, e.g., Haggai Atkes, Separation is Dead. Long Live Trade, GLOBES,
Feb. 17-18, 2000, at 60 (describing the thriving Palestinian markets which operate
close to the Green Line catering to Israeli consumers).
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little additional transportation costs.' 2 Second, the local population in
such alternative markets is substantially poorer than that of' Israel,
thereby minimizing the size of the potential target market for Pales-
tinian products.4 4 Finally, the Palestinian economy and those of the
Arab countries in the region are far more competitive than comple-
mentary. Indeed, available data clearly demonstrates that the level of
intra-regional trade among the Arab countries is negligible. 44 This is
much less the case with respect to the Israeli economy.' 45 If the Pal-
estinians wish to compete in the European or North American mar-
kets, they would have to contend with an interim period during
which they would face difficulties penetrating those markets. 46 In
that interim period, Israel would remain without substitute as the
major trading market for Palestinian goods and services and a source
142. See Elmusa & EI-Jaafari, supra note 43, at 25. These authors note that:
[the West Bank and Gaza's] production costs, greatly influenced by the Israeli
cost structure, are higher than in the non-oil-producing [Arab] states. It would
also be more difficult for the Palestinians to find the least costly materials be-
cause of the import restrictions. In order to compete, Palestinian producers
would have to become highly efficient, not an easy task considering the gen-
eral state of underdevelopment in the [occupied Palestinian territories].
Id.
143. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text (noting the significant dif-
ference between the Israeli economy and the economies of the neighboring Arab
states).
144. See Elmusa & El-Jaafari, supra note 43, at 25 (observing that "[i]nter-Arab
trade usually comprises less than five percent of the overall value of Arab trade...
largely because of the region's lack of complementarity in production and diversi-
fied industrial structure, although inter-Arab political quarrels also take their toll");
see also Riad Ajami, A Middle Eastern Free Trade Agreement (MEFTA): Pros-
pects and Possibilities, in 2 PRACTICAL PEACEMAKING IN THE MIDDLE EAST 371,
375 (Steven L. Spiegel & David J. Pervin eds., 1995) (asserting that "less than
10% of all Middle Eastern trade is with other Middle Eastern countries."); Awar-
tani & Kleiman, supra note 139, at 221 (stating that there is a "low level of eco-
nomic integration" between Middle Eastern countries because trade between the
countries is unnatural).
145. See, e.g., Awartani & Kleiman, supra note 139, at 222 (declaring that in
the absence of trade barriers, trade between Israel and the Territories can substan-
tially expand and be further enhanced by the complementary economies of both
regions).
146. See inra note 155 and accompanying text (arguing that Israeli-Palestinian
cooperation may assist in overcoming difficulties in penetrating Western markets).
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for imports. Separating the two markets, therefore, would impede the
growth prospects of the Palestinian economy.
Economic integration between the Israeli and Palestinian econo-
mies also holds the promise of benefits accruing to the latter from
economies of scale. First, a major obstacle to rapid development of
the local economy is the lack of adequate infrastructure. Israel's
policy concerning the Territories in the past thirty years has certainly
a lot to do with this. Yet, regardless of the past, the size of the local
economy does not justify the installation of expensive facilities and
infrastructure, such as power stations, that are designed to service
only the Palestinian population. Despite the political appeal of "sym-
bolic modernization,"'4 7 especially in the context of a newly inde-
pendent state, investing in such projects may significantly retard
economic welfare and well being for the individual Palestinian and
create a substantial balance of payments deficit.'4 A more efficient
use of the scarce resources available to the Palestinians would be the
joint use of existing Israeli infrastructure. Joint Israeli-Palestinian
ownership or operation of certain facilities may create an equilibrium
between the Palestinian need for national symbols and the economic
risks resulting from substantial investments in such independent
projects.4 9 Indeed, even if going its own way is the preferred choice
for Palestine, it could use existing infrastructure and facilities in the
transition period. This choice further weakens the force of the "sov-
ereignty" argument.
Second, the small size of the Palestinian economy substantially
limits the scope and nature of competitive industry that can develop
there.'5° An integrationist model involving Palestine and Israel would
147. GALBRAITH, supra note 119, at 204-05 (describing "symbolic moderniza-
tion" as a tool used by politicians to reinforce national sentiments as well as the
notion that their country is prosperous).
148. See id. (explaining how symbolic modernization actually hinders eco-
nomic growth of a country paying for such investment).
149. See Awartani & Kleiman, supra note 139, at 227-28 (noting that invest-
ment in common infrastructure projects and, more generally, in joint business
ventures, is an important ingredient of regional integration); Gross & Sagi, supra
note 45, at 61.
150. At the same time, the small size of the local economy practically rules out
the possibility of adopting an import-substitution strategy. Hence, a policy geared
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vastly increase the size of the market opened to Palestinian goods
and services.' Finally, economic development is also connected to
the creation of clusters of interdependent and complementary indus-
tries as well as commercial and business centers. Such clusters and
centers tend to form in specific areas where a critical mass of indus-
tries and other businesses is located.' 52 Silicon Valley is the paradigm
of such cluster formation.' 53 On a smaller scale, another typical ex-
ample of such formations is the concentration of high tech related in-
dustries near Hertzelia, Israel. Industries and businesses that are part
of such a cluster can receive technological, logistical, and financial
support by specialized firms and supporting industries, supply goods
and services required by other industries and businesses in that re-
gion, and enjoy access to information. Thus, the costs to manufactur-
ers are reduced and available resources are more efficiently allo-
cated. The Palestinian industrial and business sectors are neither
sizeable nor concentrated enough to form the necessary critical mass.
Yet, their geographical proximity to the Israeli business and indus-
trial centers would enable local businesses and industries to resort to
existing Israeli support structures, making necessary adjustments in
order to make those more amenable to their specific needs and de-
mands. '
14
towards encouraging exports and international trade is, for all practical purposes,
an economic necessity.
151. See Economic Transition in the Occupied Territories, an Interview with
Stanley Fischer, 23(4) J. PALESTINE STUD. 52, 58 (1994) (stating that free trade
with regional partners is extremely important in the world economy). Stanley
Fischer suggested that:
[h]ow important is free trade with their neighbors for the Palestinians? It is
very important, because the economy is so small. If Palestinian industry is to
reach any reasonable size, it can only be on the basis of becoming an export
economy. The largest neighboring market is Israel, and that would be a natu-
ral place to export to.
Id.
152. See MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS
(1990) (explaining the formation of clusters of industries and their effect on the
economic growth of countries).
153. See id. at 151 (commenting on the Silicon Valley cluster formation).
154. Gross & Sagi, supra note 45, at 62 (discussing the advantages to Palestin-
ian manufacturers and businesses from proximity to Israeli industrial and commer-
cial clusters).
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Israeli-Palestinian cooperation may open up important new mar-
kets for Palestinian goods. Penetrating the European or North-
American markets may prove a difficult task for Palestinian produc-
ers. Reasons for these difficulties include fierce competition charac-
terizing these markets, the markets' high level of technical require-
ments and standards, the Palestinian's lack of sophisticated
technological know-how, and the absence of appropriate marketing
mechanisms. Israeli-Palestinian cooperation may remove some of
these obstacles.'55 At the same time, eliminating trade barriers be-
tween the two neighbors will facilitate a higher degree of transfer
and spillover of technology, as well as administrative, managerial
and organizational knowledge, from the developed Israeli market to
the developing Palestinian market. With strong incentives to produce
goods that meet the higher demands of the Israeli customers, the hu-
man capital in Palestine and the quality of locally manufactured
goods and services supplied will further improve." ' Given the avail-
able market's larger size, new possibilities opened to investors, and
the potential extension to Palestine of preferential trade arrangements
entered into by Israel with third party trading partners, there will be
increased attraction for private foreign investment. This holds the
promise of a rapid and robust economic growth in Palestine.
On the other hand, a complete separation between Israel and Pal-
estine would perpetuate the economic inferiority of the new Pales-
tinian state and could lead to the domestic destabilization of its po-
litical regime at a time when stability and calm are precious
commodities. 7 Such effects may also endanger the maintenance of
155. Sadan, supra note 121, at 6.
156. Gross & Sagi, supra note 45, at 62; Kanafani. supra note 57, at 39.
157. See GALBRAITH, supra note 119, at 222-23, noting that:
In Europe in the last several decades, governments have been stable and se-
cure because their people have been contented and secure. International coop-
eration, and most notably the creation of the Common Market, has been pos-
sible for the same reason .... As well-being is a solvent for tensions, so
poverty is a principal cause. The poor countries are the focus of internal dis-
turbance, insecurity, interracial friction and international conflict because
these are intimately a part of the politics of privation.
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peaceful relations with Israel.'" Israel stands to gain a great deal
from an enhanced economic welfare on the Palestinian side, if only
for the fact that economic prosperity is a strong disincentive to vio-
lence.'59 Raising the standard of living of the Palestinian people, con-
ferring upon them the economic dividends of peace, and putting
them in a position of having something to lose,' is critical to the
strengthening of peace between the two states.'6 ' As such, it is as
much an Israeli interest as it is a Palestinian one.'62 Although the
static economic gains accruing to the Israeli economy from an eco-
nomic integration with the Palestinian economy seem relatively
158. See, e.g., Fidler, supra note 72, at 531 (noting that "Palestinians who see
no improvement in their standard of living or find no economic opportunities as a
result of the peace process will question the wisdom of making deals with Israel
and perhaps support forces that oppose the peace process."); see also Drake, supra
note 84, at 27 (noting that "at the level of the ordinary Arab citizen, the phenome-
non of unfulfilled expectations, generated by an unwarranted a priori belief in a
Middle Eastern version of the trickle-down theory, provides a second layer of anti-
normalization sentiment."); HELLER, supra note 104, at 79 ("[I]f the [Palestinian]
state's inability to satisfy the economic needs of its subjects were so pronounced as
to threaten a government's position, that government might feel compelled to re-
new the confrontation with Israel ...."). Following the signing of the DOP, public
opinion polls in the Territories found that about two-thirds of Palestinians had ex-
pectations of rapid economic growth.
159. See, e.g., Address by Minister for Foreign Afjairs Shimon Peres to the
Middle East/North Africa Economic Summit, Casablanca, Oct. 31-Nov. 1, 1994
(visited May 8, 2000) <www.Israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?mfah0Or10> (noting
that "today's source of violence is principally the menace from within: poverty
breeding despair. Our aim is to address ourselves to a Middle East, where its peo-
ple will have a higher standard of living and a lower standard of violence.").
160. GAZIT, supra note 23, at 207 ("'Let them have something to lose.' This
slogan became a fundamental tenet of the Israeli policy in the Territories ... The
military government was constrained in the effective punitive measures it could
take, and the substitute found was the system of 'revoking privileges and rights."')
(translated by the author); see also id. at 278-79.
161. GALBRAITH, supra note 119, at 22-23 (stating that a country's economic
well-being promotes international peace and cooperation).
162. See, e.g., GAZIT, supra note 23, at 182 (describing guidelines set by the Is-
raeli Minister of Defense, Moshe Dayan, on November 17, 1967, concerning the
activities of the Israeli military government in the Territories). Dayan ruled that
raising the standard of living of the local inhabitants was crucial, among other
things, as a necessary component in fighting terrorism. In his view, the most effec-
tive war on terrorism was possible when individuals had something to lose if peace
and calm were replaced by acts of terror. Id.
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small, the dynamic gains, both economically and politically, are sig-
nificant.' 63 Accelerated economic growth under conditions of peace
and economic integration may be attributable to the lowering of de-
fense expenditures, coupled with the reallocation of resources cur-
rently used for military needs, attraction of foreign investment, en-
hanced economic efficiency based on regional trade, improvement of
the regional infrastructure and human capital, and higher productiv-
ity' 6
4
C. A BULL IN A CHINA SHOP: INTEGRATION UNDER CONDITIONS
OF SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC INEQUALITY
As noted above, there exists Palestinian apprehension of economic
integration becoming a means of replacing the military occupation
by Israeli economic control over the Territories. This fear is all the
more pronounced when considering the substantial disparity between
the two economies insofar as their respective sizes, levels of devel-
opment and sophistication, openness, and structure are concerned.
The anticipated asymmetrical interdependence between the Israeli
and the Palestinian economies is certainly a cause for alarm among
Palestinians. 6 1 Israel may use such asymmetry in the future, as it has
done in the past, to coerce the Palestinian state into making addi-
tional political and economic concessions." Yet, seen from the per-
spective of neo-classical trade theory, economic integration under
163. See, e.g., ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE ET AL., TOWARDS FREE TRADE IN THE
MIDDLE EAST: THE TRIAD AND BEYOND 7 (1995) (explaining that static gains from
economic integration refer, by and large, to the effects on welfare through speciali-
zation based on comparative advantages, whereas dynamic gains derive from, inter
alia, increased level of competition, technology transfer, and market expansion). It
is noteworthy that in the late 1980s Ben-Shahar estimated that within ten years of
peace, Israel's GNP could be about twenty-two percent higher than in the absence
of peace. Haim Ben-Shahar, Economic Cooperation in the Middle East: From
Dream to Reality, in ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST 1, 5 (Gideon
Fishelson ed., 1989).
164. See generally Ben-Shahar, supra note 163, at 5-6 (discussing the costs of
war).
165. See ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INDEPENDENCE:
WORLD POLITICS IN TRANSITION 11 (2d ed. 1989) (discussing the possibility of
asymmetrical interdependencies as a source of power).
166. See, e.g., Amon & Weinblatt, supra note 16, at 41.
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conditions of economic size asymmetries is expected to confer
greater benefits on the smaller, rather than the larger, economy."'
Economic integration among nations whose size of domestic
economies vary greatly from each other is not unique to the Israeli-
Palestinian experience. Several regional trade arrangements involv-
ing economies of substantially different sizes exist in the world to-
day. Their experiences, while not necessarily fully applicable to the
Middle Eastern context, may well be of use and interest to policy-
makers in that region. An instructive example in this context is the
North American arrangement and the economic relations it estab-
lished between Canada, the United States, and Mexico in the frame-
work of the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA").6 "
Although the colonial subtext is absent in this context, and there is
no issue of entrenched animosities between the trading partners,
much can be gleaned from the experience accumulated in the six
years since this agreement came into force on January 1, 1994.
The differences in size of the relevant economies are similar in the
Israeli-Palestinian and the U.S.-Mexican contexts. Measured in total
GNP terms, the Palestinian economy is about 4.5 percent of the size
of the Israeli economy, 69 whereas the Mexican economy is about 4.6
percent the size of the United States."'7 Substantial differences also
exist with respect to the GNP per capita indicator.' Over eighty per-
cent of all Mexican exports are exported to the United States mar-
167. See, e.g., LAWRENCE, supra note 163, at 9 (explaining the effects of eco-
nomic integration); see also, Sussman, supra note 82 (contrasting the experience of
the expansion of the European Economic Community to include the relatively
smaller economies of Portugal, Greece, and Ireland, with the isolationist trade
policy adopted by the Republic of Ireland until the early 1960s).
168. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605
(1993). See Ephraim Kleiman, Peace and Trade with Neighbors, 41 ECON, Q. 32,
37-40 (1994); Garvey, supra note 72, at 163 (suggesting that NAFTA and its dis-
pute resolution processes present "the most revealing parallels for addressing fnn-
damental problems of political and economic development in the Middle East.").
169. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (detailing the differences in dis-
parity between the Palestinian and Israeli economies).
170. See WDI 2000, supra note 37 (in 1998 Mexico's GNP was $368 billion,
whereas the United States' GNP was $7,903 billion).
171. Id. (reporting that GNP per capita levels stood at S29,240 for the United
States, S19,170 for Canada, and $3,840 for Mexico).
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ket. 2 The phenomenon of export of labor services from one country
to another, playing a prominent role in the Israeli-Palestinian context,
is also prevalent in the economic relations between Mexico and the
United States.1
7 1
Evaluating the economic success of NAFTA is not a straightfor-
ward matter in light of the peso crisis that hit Mexico in 1994, which
had substantial impact on imports to, and exports from, Mexico.
However, available data indicates an increase in the volume of bilat-
eral trade between Mexico and the United States between 1994 and
1996, with a 2.3 percent increase in the market share of Mexican
goods in overall imports to the United States, and a 6.2 percent in-
crease in the market share of American goods in overall imports to
Mexico during the same period.' 7 NAFTA, and the easy access it af-
forded Mexican goods to the large American and Canadian markets,
had a positive effect on Mexico's relative rapid emergence from the
crisis. Whereas five years were needed for Mexico to overcome a
1982 peso crisis, only two years were required to return to its pre-
crisis level after the 1994 crisis.'" Exporting was the main cause of
172. See, e.g., World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review: Mexico, Octo-
ber 1997, PressITPRB/63, Oct. 2, 1997 (noting that: "[r]eflecting their growing
bilateral trade relationship, the share of Mexico's merchandise trade with the
United States rose from 75 per cent in 1992 to 80 per cent in 1996.").
173. See, e.g., AT THE CROSSROADS: MEXICO AND U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY
(Frank D. Bean et al eds., 1997); see also FREDERICK M. ABBOTT, LAW AND
POLICY OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION: THE NAFTA AND WESTERN HEMISPHERIC
INTEGRATION IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION SYSTEM 17-18 (1995) (argu-
ing that an important goal of the United States in concluding the NAFTA was "to
stem the tide of illegal immigration from Mexico").
174. See U.S. Executive Branch, Study on the Operation ,and Effect of the .Vorth
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), at iv-vi, 35-36 (visited May 14, 2000)
<http://wwv.ustr.gov/reports/index/html> [hereinafter U.S. Executive Branch
NAFTA Study] (noting a 17.2 percent rise in the market share of American textile
products imported to Mexico and a 19.2 percent rise in the market share of trans-
port equipment originating in Mexico and imported to the United States); see also
Nora C. Lustig, NAFTA: Setting the Record Straight, in TiIE WORLD ECONOMY -
GLOBAL TRADE POLICY 1997 89 (Sven Arndt & Chris Milner eds., 1998) (evalu-
ating the effects of NAFTA on Mexico's economy).
175. Frederick M. Abbott, The North American Integration Regime and Its Inm-
plications for the World Trading Systen 42 (Jean Monnet Papers, No. 299, Har-
vard Lav School) (1999) (noting that Mexican manufacturing returned to its pre-
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this rapid economic recovery. In 1995 alone, Mexico's volume of
non-oil exports rose by 47.5 percent compared with the previous
year.' 76 More significantly, after 1994, the annual average growth rate
of Mexican exports to the United States was more than ten percent
higher than the equivalent figure for the period of 1991 through
1993. 77 Similarly, the Mexican government made public its opinion
that NAFTA had been a crucial factor in Mexico's ability to maintain
relative stability during the 1997-98 currency crisis that hit so many
other economies around the world, including several Latin and South
American countries. 178
Much of the opposition to NAFTA in the United States focused on
the fear of losing American jobs, especially those in vulnerable sec-
tors such as the automotive industry, to Mexico due to lower wages.
This fear was described as the "giant sucking sound" of jobs "going
south."' 79 Today, Israeli opponents of an economic integration with
Palestine also fear losing jobs as a result of integration with the Pal-
estinians, especially in already hard-hit sectors such as textile manu-
facturing. Many textile factories are located in major unemployment
centers in Israel, and are the largest employer for those lucky enough
to find a job. The loss of additional jobs, or even the closing down of
these factories, would disproportionately hit these already disadvan-
taged areas. Not only will they not be better off as a result of inte-
gration, but actually their economic condition will deteriorate further.
In turn, opponents conclude, this will have repercussions in the so-
crisis level by 1996); see Lustig, supra note 174, at 91 (arguing that NAFTA con-
tributed to Mexican recovery from the peso crisis).
176. See Lustig, supra note 174, at 9 1.
177. See id. (indicating that Mexican exports to the United States increased as a
result of NAFTA).
178. See Abbott, supra note 175, at 44-45.
179. See, e.g., Peter Behr, Fears of Job Exodus Emerge as Chief Hurdle for
Free Trade Pact, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 1993, at C15 (quoting Ross Perot) (pre-
dicting NAFTA would create "a giant sucking sound" as U.S. firms relocated to
Mexico); see also Lance Compa, International Labor Rights and the Sovereignti
Question: NAFTA and Guatemala, Two Case Studies, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 117 (1993); Jorge F. Perez-Lopez & Eric Griego, The Labor Dimension of
the NAFTA: Reflections on the First Year, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 473
(1995).
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cial, political, and economic structures of Israel."'"
The experience under NAFTA, however, does not support this
grim outlook. For example, in the first nine months of 1996, the
number of American employees displaced due to NAFTA constituted
a mere 0.01 percent of the total number of American employees who
were displaced in that same period. ' In other words, even if NAFTA
caused some individuals to lose their jobs, their number was negligi-
ble in the context of the overall trend in the American labor market.
Furthermore, taking into account not only the number of jobs lost
due to the agreement, but also the number of new jobs created as a
result of its operation and implementation, initial data indicates that
NAFTA had an overall positive aggregate effect on the American la-
bor market.'82 We can predict that similar consequences will result
from an Israeli-Palestinian agreement on economic integration. A
further indication that Palestinian workers employed in Israel do not,
by and large, take jobs away from Israelis, is seen in the fact that
most of the jobs previously occupied by Palestinian workers and
made available as a result of the hItifada and the Israeli government
closure policy were not filled by Israeli workers, but rather by im-
porting foreign workers from East Europe, Africa, and the Far East.
Furthermore, the complementary structures of the two markets also
minimize the risks ofjob losses and the concomitant adjustments.
Certainly this comes as no consolation to those who lose their
jobs. For them general statistics are of no interest. ' It is important to
note that these considerations are not, however, unique to the Israeli-
Palestinian context. "Pauper labor" arguments are perennial in the
on-going debate concerning the desirability of free trade and trade
180. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION
OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 242-43 (2d ed., 1999).
181. See Lustig, supra note 174, at 93.
182. See id. at 96; U.S. Executive Branch NAFTA Study. supra note 174, at i
(estimating that exports to Canada and Mexico supported 2.3 million jobs in the
United States in 1996).
183. It falls to their country to ensure that such individuals can find alternative
employment by operating adequate adjustment assistance programs. See
TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 180, at 240-45 (discussing labor market ad-
justment policies to counter the dislocation effects of trade liberalization).
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liberalization.1 8 4
Finally, NAFTA was also challenged on environmental grounds.
Opponents argued the agreement would have an adverse effect on the
environment in the United States, particularly in the border areas
between the United States and Mexico, due to arguably lower stan-
dards of environmental protection in Mexico. To ease this fear, the
NAFTA signatories added a side agreement dealing specifically with
the protection of the environment. '" Given the geographical proxim-
ity of Israel and Palestine and the small size of the two, detrimental
environmental effects in one country will not be substantially deter-
mined by the existence or absence of an economic integration be-
tween the two parties. The real issue, therefore, is not finding ways
to confine environmental degradation to the territory of another
country, but rather cooperating in order to prevent such degradation
or minimize its scope and effects in the region as a whole. Further-
more, even within the framework of free trade arrangements, partici-
pating nations may have the option to intervene, under appropriate
circumstances, in the free flow of goods, services, labor and capital
for protection of legitimate interests such as public health and envi-
ronmental protection.
There are other examples of economic integration carried out on a
regional or sub-regional basis between parties of substantially differ-
ent economic sizes. Indeed, there are even examples of deeper eco-
nomic integration between such parties, going beyond the FTA
model adopted under NAFTA. Under the umbrella of the Southern
Cone Common Market ("Mercosur"), Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay,
and Uruguay pursue the goal of establishing a common market.'1"
184. See, e.g., JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 18 (3d ed. 1995) (illustrating popular arguments for trade
restrictions).
185. See North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 32 I.L.M.
1480 (entered into force on Jan. 1, 1994); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1311 (b) (1994) (en-
acting NAFTA's side environmental agreement into law). See also Richard H.
Steinberg, Trade-Environment Negotiations in the EU, NAFTA, and WTO: Re-
gional Trajectories of Rule Development, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 231, 245-53 (1997);
TREBILCOCK & HOwSE, sutpra note 180, at 432-40.
186. See Treaty Establishing a Common Market Between the Argentine Repub-
lic, the Federal Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Republic of
1592 [15:1539
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEA CE
Mercosur is a sub-regional trade arrangement that includes countries
whose GNP is as small as 1.2 percent of the GNP of other mem-
bers.'87 Also, the history of the evolution of the European Economic
Community ("Community") and its expansion to include within its
scope the relatively smaller and structurally different economies of
Ireland, Greece, Spain, and Portugal, is a success story, both for the
Community at large and for those individual countries in particular,
notwithstanding fears of integrating these economies."'
Coming back once again to the context of the Israeli-Palestinian
relations, the history of involuntary, one-sided economic integration
of the Territories' and the Israeli economies, actually facilitates the
move towards future consensual economic integration between them
since they have already incurred some of the expected adjustment
and transition costs into a free trade regime. Thus, future costs may
be lower in comparison with situations of integrating "from
scratch."' 9
Uruguay, Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1041 (establishing Mercosur - Mercado
Comtdn del Sur). In 1996, Chile and Bolivia joined Mercosur as associate mem-
bers. See generally Lisa Anderson, Comment, The Future of Hemispheric Free
Trade: Towards a Unified Hemisphere?, 20 HOUSTON J. INT'L L. 635, 654-56
(1998). Negotiations for further widening and deepening Mercosur are currently
under way. Id. at 656-59. For analysis of Mercosur's economic achievements see,
e.g., Danny M. Leipziger et al., Mercosur: hItegration and Industrial Poli-, in
THE WORLD ECONOMY - GLOBAL TRADE POLICY 1997 69, 76-79 (Sven Arndt &
Chris Milner eds., 1998); F6lix Pefia, Some Lessons from the Mercosur Initial Er-
perience, in REGIONALISM AND MULTILATERALISM AFTER THE URUGUAY ROUND -
CONVERGENCE, DIVERGENCE AND INTERACTION 161, 167-70 (Paul Demaret et al
eds., 1997).
187. See WDI 2000, supra note 37 (listing economic data for countries and
economies). Brazil's GNP stands at a level of S767.6 billion and Argentina's at
$290.6 billion, whereas Paraguay's is S9.2 billion and Uruguay's S20 billion. In
GNP per capita terms, Argentina (S8,030), Uruguay (S6,070) and Brazil (S4,630)
are significantly ahead of Paraguay (S 1,760). Id. In fact, with Bolivia joining as an
associate member, the economic disparities indicated above deepened further as
Bolivia's GNP ($8 billion) and GNP per capita (S1,010) are the lowest of all mem-
ber countries. Id.
188. See, e.g., Sussman, supra note 82, at 633-35.
189. See, e.g., Kotschwar, supra note 47, at 137-39 (noting the costs to coun-
tries with small economies that enter into trade and integration arrangements);
LAWRENCE, supra note 163, at 16 (noting that, due to the fact that the Territories
have been exposed to Israeli competition and are without an extensive import-
competing industry, maintaining open trade with Israel will pose few adjustment
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III. LEVELS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: FREE
TRADE AREA OR CUSTOMS UNION?
The arguments discussed in Part II point to the desirability of
some sort of integration between the Israeli and Palestinian econo-
mies. Yet, saying that economic integration is preferable to complete
separation between the Israeli and Palestinian economies does not
convey a commitment to any specific model of integration. The
question of which model of economic integration is most suitable for
the permanent status agreement between Israel and the Palestinians is
not confined to evaluating economic considerations. It is a question
of balancing conflicting economic, political, cultural, and social in-
terests. For proponents of integration, finding modes of accommo-
dating those counter-arguments is a major challenge on the road to
building a structure for a just and long-lasting peace between Israelis
and Palestinians.
A. MODELS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
The term "economic integration" connotes the process by which
the economies of several sovereign states are combined and the eco-
nomic borders between them are gradually removed.' 90 More specifi-
cally, it refers to arrangements aimed primarily at the elimination of
barriers to free movement of goods and services (and potentially also
factors of production) within the integrated area. While the reasons
underlying a state's decision to pursue a policy of economic integra-
tion need not be confined to the economic sphere,' 9' the gains in
terms of economic welfare of such integration are clearly of great
importance for the member states.' 92
difficulties. However, such difficulties may occur with respect to firms that ex-
panded as a result of Palestinian self-sufficiency strategy during the Intida).
190. See MOLLE, supra note 118, at 8 (defining economic integration as the
gradual elimination of economic frontiers between independent states, resulting in
the economies of several states functioning as one).
191. See, e.g., John Whalley, Why Do Countries Seek Regional Trade Agree-
inents?, in THE REGIONALIZATION OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 63 (Jeffrey A.
Frankel ed., 1998) (formulating reasons for negotiating regional trade agreements).
192. For the economic theory underlying the creation of regional trade arrange-
ments see generally ROBSON, supra note 97; JACOB VINER, THE CUSTOMS UNION
ISSUE (1950).
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The classical discourse concerning regional trade arrangements
identifies several models of economic integration, distinguished from
each other according to the depth and breadth of integration among
the parties involved.' 93 For the purposes of this discussion, three basic
models ought to be mentioned. The lowest level of integration is an
FTA. An FTA refers to the elimination among the states parties of
all, or substantially all, barriers to free movement of goods and serv-
ices, while allowing each party to retain an independent trade policy
vis-A-vis third countries outside the integrated area. The different
treatment accorded to goods and services originating from within the
integrated area and goods and services originating in third countries
necessitates the existence of rules of origin and of border mecha-
nisms, such as customs stations, to verify the origin and to monitor
cross-border movement of imported goods in order to prevent trade
deflection.' 94
A closer economic integration results under the customs union
model. As in the case of the FTA, the goal is the elimination of all
barriers to the free and uninterrupted movement of goods and serv-
ices among the member states. In addition, the member states adopt a
single external trade policy towards third countries by establishing a
single external customs regime.
A common market is the next stage of economic integration.
Sharing the features of the customs union, it adds the element of free
movement of factors of production. This requires a higher degree of
harmonization on issues such as immigration policies and taxation.
Economic integration, which is, in essence, a mutual preferential
treatment arrangement among the member states, does not comport
with a fundamental principle of the modem multilateral trade system,
i.e., the most favored nation principle ("MFN") enshrined in the
193. See BELA A. BALASSA, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 1-17
(1961) (introducing the concept and forms of integration); MOLLE, supra note 118,
at 10-12.
194. See ROBSON, supra note 97, at 28 (explaining that trade deflection occurs
when goods are imported into the member country with the lowest tariff and then
redirected to another member of the FTA, thus bypassing the latter country's
higher tariff and exploiting the tariff differential). In the Israeli-Palestinian context,
trade deflection may take place even with small tariff differentials between Israel
and Palestine due to low transportation costs.
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General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"). '"; However,
GATT Article XXIV recognizes the need to allow for some excep-
tions to the MFN principle, as far as regional trade arrangements are
concerned.' 6 Article XXIV deals with FTAs and customs unions and
exempts their member states from the dictates of the MFN provision
inasmuch as such member states are not required to extend to non-
member states the same trade concessions accorded to other states
that are members of the relevant FTA or customs union. Thus, Arti-
cle XXIV accommodates preferential trade regimes within the
framework of the multilateral trade system.
Article XXIV sets a number of conditions for a specific regional
trade arrangement to be acceptable under the GATT, which are
meant to prevent the possibility of easy manipulation of Article
XXIV by members of the World Trade Organization ("WTO") to
avoid their obligations under the MFN principle.197 The major sub-
stantive condition is the "all or nothing" requirement.' A regional
trade arrangement is considered compatible with the GATT only if
the member states have committed to liberalize "substantially all"
trade between them. ' 9 The underlying rationale for this requirement
is that, by doing so, the member states demonstrate their sincerity
and seriousness about eliminating trade barriers among them on a
broad basis. It also shows that they do not intend to use Article
XXIV merely as a mechanism to discriminate against third countries
195. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A- I1,
55 U.N.T.S. 194, 196 [hereinafter GATT].
196. See, e.g., R. H. Snape, History and Economics of GA7Ts Article XXIV, in
REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 273 (Kym Anderson
& Richard Blackhurst eds., 1993) (explaining the reasoning behind Article XXIV);
JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 576-77 (1969).
197. See BERNARD HOEKMAN & MICHEL KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 218 (1995); JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM - LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
165-66 (2d ed., 1997) (stating the requirements necessary to satisfy Article XXIV
of the GATT).
198. JACKSON, supra note 197, at 165.
199. See GATT, supra note 195, Article XXIV:8 (imposing requirements on
customs unions so that they are compatible with GATT obligations); 2 WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION, ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE
824-27 (6th ed. 1995).
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or to bypass selectively the MFN rule with respect to specific
goods.20 Thus, to be GATT-compatble," any arrangement for eco-
nomic integration among WTO member states must be comprehen-
sive and not merely content itself with liberalizing trade in a limited
number of goods or in particular sectors.2'2 Insofar as the relevant
actors in the Middle East are WTO members, these provisions set the
international legal framework for constructing regional trade rela-
tions among them. 03
200. See J. M. Finger, GATT's hlfluence on Regional Agreements, in NEW
DIMENSIONS IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION 134 (Jaime de Melo & Arvind Panagariya
eds., 1993) (explaining the rationale of Article XXIV's requirements).
201. See, e.g., HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 197, at 218-19 (concluding
that the monitoring of the compatibility of FTAs and customs unions arrangements
with the GATT is ineffective); David R. Karasik, Securing the Peace Dividend in
the Middle East: Amending GA TT Article YVIV to Allow Sectoral Preferences in
Free Trade Areas, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 527, 541-44 (1997) (questioning the con-
tinued utility of Article XXIV because it is seldom complied with and does not
adequately serve international economic purposes). See also Serge Devos, The
Multilateral Rules and the New Dimension of Regional Integration: Weaknesses,
Need and Scope for more Disciplines, in REGIONALISM AND MULTILAkTERALISNI
AFTER THE URUGUAY ROUND - CONVERGENCE, DIVERGENCE AND IN'TERAC-irION
725, 737-44 (Paul Demaret et al. eds., 1997).
202. But see Karasik, supra note 201, at 549-55 (advocating the establishment
of a "sectoral trade area" in the Middle East, i.e., a free trade area that will reduce
trade barriers only for those economic sectors in which the relevant actors enjoy
complementary production structures such as textile, chemicals, energy, and trans-
portation). Karasik puts forward a proposal to amend Article XXIV of the GATT
so as to accommodate such a model of economic integration. See id. at 555-56,
561-63. Alternatively he argues that such an arrangement may be facilitated by
other venues made possible under already existing GATT provisions. See id. at
556-61.
203. See WTO Home Page, Members (visited May 11, 2000) <http:,,www.wto.
orgfwto/about/organsn6.htm> (listing the following Middle Eastern/North Africa
countries as WTO members: Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco,
Qatar, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates). Algeria, Oman, and Saudi Arabia
are being reviewed by WTO accession working parties. The Palestinian Authority
is not a member of the WTO. It is interesting to note that Article 1:3 of the GATT
provides an exemption from the MFN rules with respect to "preferences between
countries formerly a part of the Ottoman Empire and detached from it on July 24,
1923," provided that a waiver is given to that effect by Ministerial Conference. See
GATT, supra note 195, Art. 1:3; Kleiman, supra note 168, at 33.
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B. FREE TRADE AREA OR CUSTOMS UNION?
Between 1967 and 1994, trade relations between Israel and the
Territories could only be characterized as a unilaterally imposed
customs union.' ° The Paris Protocol put forward, for the first ime,
a consensual economic agreement between the parties. The arrange-
ment agreed upon was, in principle, that of a customs union between
Israel and the Palestinian Authority, based on the Israeli customs re-
gime and import policy."6
In the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Paris Protocol,
the Palestinians insisted on the implementation of an FTA-type eco-
nomic arrangement between the Palestinian Authority and Israel,
while their Israeli counterparts pushed for a customs union regime."
For their part, the Palestinian negotiators sought to maximize the
symbols of sovereignty and political independence of the Palestinian
Authority en route to an independent Palestinian state. An FTA ar-
rangement would require the demarcation of economic borders be-
tween the parties, which, in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian con-
flict, would likely serve as precursors for the final political borders
204. See ARNON, supra note 22, at 88 (describing the trade regime that existed
between Israel and the Palestinian economy since 1967 as "an invohntay, one-
sided, impure, customs union.").
205. See, e.g., Samir Hazboun et al., The Economic Impact of the Israeli-PLO
Declaration of Principles on the West Bank, Gaza Strip and the Middle East Re-
gion, 3 ISRAEL/PALESTINE CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND INFORMATION 2 (1994)
(noting that the DOP, supra note 6, signed on September 13, 1993, already in-
cluded several provisions concerning economic cooperation between Israel and the
Palestinians). However, as the name of the document itself suggests, these provi-
sions were, for the most part, confined to setting general principles and guidelines
rather than concrete arrangements between the two parties. See also Simcha Bahiri,
Economic Consequences of the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles: An Israeli
Perspective, 3 ISRAEL/PALESTINE CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND INFORMATION 25
(1994).
206. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text (describing the principles
underlying the Paris Protocol).
207. See, e.g., Kleiman, supra note 95, at 682-85 (discussing the Israeli and Pal-
estinian positions with respect to the desired model of economic integration during
the Paris negotiations); Amon & Weinblatt, supra note 16, at 38 (discussing the
positions of the Israeli and Palestinian negotiating teams with respect to the nature
of economic integration).
1598 [15:1539
ISRAELI-PALES TINIAN PEA CE
between Israel and the Palestinian state! "' An FTA regime would
also allow the Palestinian Authority to adopt its own independent
trade policy. This last point is of special significance with respect to
the shaping of economic relations between the Palestinian Authority
and Arab countries, including those without any diplomatic, eco-
nomic, or other ties to Israel.
Israel strongly rejected the FTA model, alleging that an FTA
might "force the issue" of setting precise boundaries between Israel
and the Palestinians and support the latter's claim for an independent
state, thereby prejudging the outcome of future status negotiations
between the two sides. The economic Protocol, the Israeli negotiators
in Paris argued, being part of a political interim agreement between
the parties, could not pre-determine the outcome of the permanent
status negotiations betveen them. Thus, no economic arrangement
that mandated the existence of borders was acceptable. Instead, Israel
advocated a customs union arrangement which, it argued, would not
predetermine the question of borders between Israel and the Pales-
tinian Authority and which postponed such a decision to the perma-
nent status negotiations. "°
The outcome of the divergent positions was a customs union with
a touch of FTA flavoring. On the one hand, the Paris Protocol estab-
lished a single customs envelope covering both Israel and the areas
put under the control of the Palestinian Authority. The model for this
arrangement was the Israeli customs regime and import policy, cou-
pled with a certain degree of harmonization of trade measures and
procedures. On the other hand, the Paris Protocol granted the Pales-
208. See supra note 194 and accompanying text (indicating the need for border
mechanisms in an FTA).
209. See, e.g., Elmusa & EI-Jaafari, supra note 43, at 29 (stating that "'It would
have been nearly impossible to have two highly divergent customs regimes without
demarcating the political boundaries between the two sides. The attenuated one-
sided customs union that emerged was therefore predetermined by the DOP: poli-
tics shaped economics."). The Israeli negotiators also feared that the absence of a
unitary customs envelope might hamper Israel's ability to protect its domestic in-
dustry in certain sensitive sectors such as glass, iron, ceramics, textiles, and wood,
against competition from third countries as well as its ability to protect its public
against the importation into Israel of goods that do not conform with mandatory
technical requirements and standards or that are environmentally unfriendly.
Gabai, supra note 55, at A5; Kapota Part ii, supra note 55, at A18.
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tinian Authority the power (albeit limited to goods agreed upon by
the parties and by quotas) to set its own trade policy with respect to
imports from Arab countries."0 This compromise recognized the spe-
cial links between the Palestinians and the neighboring Arab coun-
tries, as well as the Palestinians' need for some sphere of independ-
ence in setting their own trade policy.
In 1994, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators grappled to construct a
transitional model of economic integration designed to accommodate
their needs during the interim phase of the peace negotiations. This is
no longer the case. The question on the table today concerns the na-
ture of the economic arrangements to be included in a political per-
manent status agreement.2"' The basic assumption underlying this
Article is that political boundaries will be set west of the Jordan
River. The political-legal argument made by the Israeli negotiators in
Paris will no longer be relevant. Political borders will become a real-
ity in that area. Hence, the basic question concerning the nature of
the economic and trade relations between Israel and Palestine reap-
pears: is a continuance of the customs union arrangement warranted,
or should they now employ an FTA-type model? In order to supply
an answer to this quandary, the economic meaning of borders be-
tween Israel and Palestine must be explored.
210. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
211. While some economic measures may certainly be taken independent of the
political agreements to be reached in the permanent status negotiations between the
parties, the question of economic (and political) borders between Israel and the
Palestinians is closely intertwined with the structure of the economic arrangement
to be implemented. Thus, while Garvey is certainly right in suggesting that there
has been a shift "from the view that economic progress must await political devel-
opment to the view that economic development can induce political settlement"
(Garvey, supra note 72, at 148), the shift is not complete in so far as the nature of
the permanent economic settlement will be informed by the nature of the perma-
nent political settlement between the parties.
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1. Joining Togethei, Standing Apart: The Case For and Against an
FTA
The main benefit conferred on the Palestinians by an FTA model
of economic integration is of a political nature, namely the existence
of clear attributes of sovereignty and independence. The existence of
political borders is also intertwined with trade policy considerations.
An FTA model empowers the Palestinian government to exercise an
independent trade policy and set its own tariffs and import policy
measures with respect to goods imported to Palestine that originate in
third countries not part of the FTA. This is significant for several
reasons. First, the need to verify the origin of imported goods and to
apply the national import policy, tariffs and duties to them will in-
evitably lead to the establishment of customs stations on the border
between the trading partners, emphasizing yet again the existence of
such an interstate border. Second, an FTA arrangement also endows
the nascent Palestinian state with more bargaining chips vis-a-vis
third parties with whom it may wish to conclude bilateral trade
agreements. Under an FTA, Palestine is not burdened by the rela-
tively low ceiling of the existing Israeli tariff bindings, nor by other
restrictions on trade policy measures undertaken by Israel as a mem-
ber of the WTO. Palestine can raise or lower its national tariffs as
needed to wrestle more trade concessions from third country trading
partners.1 2 Finally, the ability to conduct an independent trade policy
may prove of special significance for Palestine with respect to its
dealings with Arab and Muslim countries that do not have trade or
other relations with Israel.
Unlike the more advanced models of economic integration, an
FTA is a model of negative economic integration. It requires the
elimination of barriers to regional trade and the liberalization of trade
among the participating states. However, it does not mandate the
creation of a complex supranational institutional structure, nor does it
require deeper level of coordination of governmental policies among
the member states."" As such, negative integration is particularly
212. See Molkner, supra note 72, at 1448.
213. See JAN TINBERGEN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 117-23
(1954) (explaining that negative integration focuses on the elimination of such bar-
riers to trade as quantitative restrictions and import duties, whereas positive inte-
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suited to accommodate the economic benefits of integration with the
political needs of sovereignty and independence. This, of course,
makes it appealing to young developing nations considering the pos-
sibility of economic integration with an economically superior coun-
try. Developing countries, therefore, are particularly prone to adopt
mechanisms of low-level economic integration, preferring those to
"deeper" institutional structures of higher-level economic integra-
tion. Developing countries, many of them young and born out of the
process of decolonization, have a heightened national consciousness
while economic issues seem secondary to political needs.
The freedom to adopt and conduct an independent trade policy is
important for another reason. The narrow tax basis existing in the
Territories, as well as the apparent difficulties in collecting direct
taxes from the local population, make tariffs, import duties, and indi-
rect taxation important sources of revenue for the Palestinian gov-
ernment. Indeed, experience has taught us that most developing na-
tions rely on tariffs as an important source of revenue rather than
imposing unpopular direct taxes. '14 By having the freedom to estab-
lish its own tariff and import duty levels, the Palestinian government
may attempt to set its tariffs at a revenue-maximizing level. Forced
adoption of the Israeli tariff walls would deny the Palestinian gov-
ernment an important tool to increase its revenues.
An FTA arrangement, however, is not without its costs and limita-
tions. Most significant of all is the relatively limited implementation
that an FTA may achieve in the Israeli-Palestinian context. Much
like complete separation, an FTA requires a well-monitored border in
order to prevent smuggling between the member states. This would
lead to an informal trade deflection and deny the "importing" country
of deserved revenues. However, past experiences, including that of
the partially successful Israeli attempts to seal off the Territories in
the mid-1990s, demonstrate the futility of efforts to separate com-
pletely the two areas or to monitor tightly the border between them.
gration is concerned with measures designed to remove inconsistencies that may
exist between the duties and taxes of different countries as well as with govern-
mental action in the area of production).
214. See, e.g., GILPIN, supra note 114, at 171 (discussing the role of tariff reve-
nues in the financing of government of less developed countries).
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This is especially true with respect to the forthcoming borders be-
tween Israel and the Palestinian state in the West Bank, where the
geographical contours do not dictate a clear border." Moreover, the
physical proximity of major population centers, industrial zones, and
businesses on both sides of the border, as well as the ease with which
official customs stations and official border crossing points can be
by-passed and circumvented, can lead to massive smuggling.2'
The permeability and porosity of the future border between the
two neighbors are likely to be pronounced even more when Israeli
settlements and Jerusalem are taken into consideration. Some Israeli
settlements may remain in the West Bank (and, perhaps, even in the
Gaza Strip) as part of the permanent status agreement, making trans-
fer of goods and people between Israel and the West Bank an even
easier task. In addition, any political arrangement seeking to ensure
that Jerusalem remains an open and undivided city would hamper
215. See, e.g., AHARON KLIEMAN, COMPROMISING PALESTINE: A GUIDE TO
FINAL STATUS NEGOTIATIONS 117-19 (2000) (analyzing the porous nature of the
"green line," which is the line marked as part of the 1948 cease-fire and that dis-
tinguishes Israel from the territories which came under its control in 1967); Ze'ev
Schiff, Robbing the Country Blind, HA'ARETZ, Aug. 21, 1998.
216. Klieman argues that:
in the course of the last several years Israeli civilian, military, and police
authorities increasingly admit their inability to seal off Israel from daily en-
croachments of one sort or another from West Bankers. In other words, even
once redeployed west of the green line, for Israel this 'seam' will be anything
but seamless.
KLIEMAN, supra note 215, at 118. Klieman further notes the wide scale phenome-
non of car thefts in Israel where tens of thousands of cars are stolen in Israel,
driven into the territories controlled by the Palestinian Authority, cannibalized
there and their parts resold in Israel as spare parts. Id.; see also Douglas Jehi, Car
Thefts Lead Israel to Wall Off West Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1998, at A 13 (dis-
cussing the changed attitudes of Israelis who abandoned opposition to erecting bar-
riers between Israel and the West Bank as a result of the rise in car thefts); Aliza
Marcus, Palestinian and Israeli Car Thieves leant up, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, July 5,
1998, at 29 (according to the Israel Insurance Association "Israel has the highest
car-stealing rate in the world"); Patrick Cockburn, Cars: Palestinians turn car theft
into act of rebellion, THE INDEPENDENT, Dec. 30, 1997, at 9 ("Israel's rate of car
theft is three times higher than that in the U.S. ... As Palestinian living standards
plummeted ... car theft became one of the few growth industries."). It has also
been noted that where car thieves cross the borders, so too might terrorists,
KLIEMAN, supra, at 118-19; Schiff, supra note 215.
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any serious attempt to block effectively the transfer of people and
goods between Palestine and Israel.2 7 This should clearly bring home
the broad political implications of any economic model adopted by
the parties. A "pure" FTA arrangement requires a clear and well-
enforced border in all points of meeting between the two neighbors,
including in or around the city of Jerusalem. Jerusalem could not be
a truly open city inasmuch as there would have to be limitations and
restrictions on the movement of persons and goods to and from the
city. Not only does this limit the range of acceptable options for a
possible political agreement, but it also leads to the marginalization
of the capital. Rather than becoming a bustling, boisterous center for
commerce and trade between the two countries, and perhaps even
beyond them to the region at large," ' Jerusalem would become a
frontier city with limited prospects of playing a significant role in the
economic and political development of the region and in its trans-
formation from conflict to peace.
Even if an effective border between Israel and Palestine were con-
ceivable as a practical matter, one may not disregard the costs in-
volved in putting it up and enforcing it on a daily basis. The direct
cost of erecting a border fence around the Gaza Strip, stretching for
some 63 kilometers (39 miles), is estimated to be $16 million.2" The
direct cost of erecting a similar fence between Israel and the West
Bank is around $150 million, due to both the length of the fence and
the topographical features comprising over 314 kilometers (195
217. See GAZIT, supra note 23, at 211 (finding that the destruction, on June 29,
1967, of the wall separating the eastern and western parts of Jerusalem has blurred
the borders between Israel and the West Bank).
218. See, e.g., Awartani & Kleiman, supra note 139 (concluding that the mar-
kets for Middle East exports lie outside the region and that the observed low pro-
pensity towards intra-regional trade results from fundamental economic causes, but
that there is a prospect for substantial border-type trade among Israel-Jordan-the
Territories due mainly to their physical proximity); Kleiman, supra note 168, at
33-37 (concluding that "the cause for the relatively small volume of intra-regional
trade ... is, primarily [the fact] that these are, to a large extent, economies that pro-
duce the same things ... markets of oil and camels have nothing to export to mar-
kets of oil and camels" id. at 37). Compare with Ajami, supra note 144, at 377-83
(identifying potential synergies associated with increased trade between Middle
Eastern countries).
219. Gross & Sagi, supra note 45, at 68.
1604 [15:1539
ISRAELI-PALES TIN.-IN PEA CE
miles) of the territory. -'0 Of course, in addition to initial direct costs,
other costs must be taken into consideration related to the physical
maintenance, monitoring, and guarding of the border.
-
,
The operation of customs stations along the Israeli-Palestinian
border would add administrative expenditures. There are also the
costs involved in administering rules of origin at those stations, espe-
cially those resulting from complicated inspection procedures.:":
Rules of origin may be used as a non-tariff protectionist barrier to
trade, thus undermining some of the economic benefits of the free
trade regime.m These rules could also lead to increased trade diver-
sion, even within the FTA structure. 22
4
Finally, costly rent seeking activity is more likely to take place
under the conditions of an FTA model than under models of deeper
economic integration. This is so because under an FTA structure
220. Id.
221. See, e.g., K.LIEMAN, supra note 215, at 119 (noting that the separation of
Israel and the West Bank by use of physical obstacles such as fences, walls, safety
railings and so forth, and recruiting, training and funding additional police and se-
curity forces to monitor the green line, are likely to cost over NIS 100 million a
year, but would only achieve partial coverage); see also Jehl, supra note 216, at
A13 (discussing heightened Israeli interest in erecting barriers to funnel traffic
between Israel and the West Bank through controlled check points).
222. See, e.g., David Palmeter, Rules of Origin in Regional Trade Arrange-
mnents, in REGIONALISM AND MULTILATERALISM AFTER TIE URUGUAY ROUND -
CONVERGENCE, DIVERGENCE AND INTERACTION 341, 346 (Paul Demaret et al.
eds., 1997) (quoting a study showing that the total economic cost of rules of origin
is 5 percent of the value of traded goods between the European Communities and
the EFTA nations, leading exporters of up to 25 percent of the presumably eligible
trade to forego the preference and pay the MFN duty). The complexity inherent in
the implementation of rules of origin is further exacerbated in the Israeli-
Palestinian context, since Israel is a member of several overlapping FTAs, which
may not necessarily prescribe similar rules of origin. In this -hub and spokes" sce-
nario, applying rules of origin between Israel and Palestine may become increas-
ingly more complex and, therefore, more costly.
223. See, e.g., Joseph A. LaNasa III, Rules of Origin and the Uruguav Round's
Effectiveness in Harnionizing and Regulating Thein, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 625, 626-
28 (1996) (describing how rules of origin act as barriers to trade); David N. Pal-
meter, Rules of Origin or Rules of Restriction: ,4 Comnentar
" 
on a New Form of
Protectionism, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1 (1987) (discussing how quotas based on
a determination of country of origin restrict trade).
224. See Kanafani, supra note 57, at 46.
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there is more room for interest groups to pressure their governments
into adopting policies designed to further the protection of domestic
sectors. Thus, there are costs resulting from rent-seeking behavior on
the part of interest groups seeking to manipulate existing rules in
their favor or influence the content and scope of future rules of ori-
225gin.
The existence of border control mechanisms, such as customs sta-
tions, may lead to abuses and interference with the free flow of
goods and services between Israel and Palestine. Domestic protec
tionist pressures may increase, resulting in calls on the governments
to limit the flow of goods and services. In addition, decades of hos-
tility and mutual suspicion between Israelis and Palestinians may re-
sult in trigger-happy conduct by each party's national authorities,
using and abusing "security" considerations as pretext to interfere
with trade.227 Indeed, even assuming a bona fide attempt on both
sides to allow free and uninterrupted movement of goods and serv-
ices between themselves, the quantitative magnitude of goods and
persons moving through the official border crossings may be such
that crossing arrangements will form non-tariff barriers to trade. This
is due to long delays at customs stations, causing frustration, in-
creasing costs, and creating yet another incentive to engage in smug-
gling. Border control mechanisms may also lead to administrative
abuse and corruption on both sides of the border. This is particularly
alarming in light of the serious and persistent allegations of corrup-
225. Anne 0. Krueger, Free Trade Agreements versus Customs Unions 14-15
(NBER Working Paper No. 5084, 1995); Jagdish Bhagwati, Directly Unproductive
Profit-Seeking (DUP) Activities, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS 845 (John Eatwell ed., 1987), reprinted in POLITICAL ECONOMY AND
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 129 (Douglas A. Irwin ed., 1991) (characterizing
monopoly-seeking lobbyists that seek to establish rent-generating monopolies as
"directly unproductive profit-seeking activities").
226. See, e.g., Fischer & Schelling, supra note 15, at 9 (noting that opening
customs posts at the borders between Israel and the Territories would "set up a
potential dynamic that ends with extensive import restrictions .... ).
227. See, e.g., Garvey, supra note 72, at 176-77 (discussing regional dispute
settlement as a mechanism to counter "arbitrary, discriminatory and unduly bur-
densome security related measures").
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tion taking place in the Palestinian Authority.) '
There is yet another important consideration militating against an
FTA arrangement in the Israeli-Palestinian context. Being the lowest
level of economic integration, the classical FTA model does not ex-
tend to the free movement of factors of production, i.e., it does not
guarantee a free movement of labor within the integrated area. Yet,
Palestinian export of labor services to Israel is a major component of
the Palestinian economy and is likely to continue playing that role
after the creation of the Palestinian state. Its absence from the eco-
nomic agreement between the two parties means ignoring a core
economic issue in Israeli-Palestinian relations.
2. Uniting for Peace: The Case For and Against a Customs Union
The Paris Protocol adopted a customs union model for regulating
the economic relations between Israel and the Palestinians. By treat-
ing Israel and the Territories as one economic unit and negating the
need for drawing (economic) borders between them, this arrange-
ment suited Israel's perception of an interim agreement. But does it
also accommodate the long-term needs of both parties under the
framework of a permanent peace settlement?
The customs union model answers most of the concerns raised by
the FTA. It entails lower costs of managing the economic integration
between the parties. In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian relations
it may be difficult, if not impossible, to estimate the precise amount
of trade creation and trade diversion resulting from the adoption of
either model.29 This results from the lack of reliable Palestinian sta-
228. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (detailing a pattern of institu-
tional and individual corruption among senior officials in the Palestinian Author-
ity).
229. See, e.g., ROBSON, supra note 97, at 19-20. The trade creation-trade di-
version analysis is the standard starting point for analysis of the costs and benefits
of economic integration measures. Trade creation refers to a shift from the con-
sumption of higher-cost domestic goods to lower-cost goods imported from an-
other state that is a member of the economic integration arrangement. Trade crea-
tion is, therefore, welfare increasing. Trade diversion refers to a shift in the source
of imports from lower-cost external sources (i.e., outside the regional trade ar-
rangement) to higher-cost internal ones. Trade diversion is, therefore, welfare re-
ducing.
2000] 1607
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
tistics concerning pertinent economic data and the historical nature
of the distorted economic relations between the parties.10 Yet, a
customs union arrangement is Pareto-superior to an FTA - in terms
of wealth maximization - since there can be no more trade creation
and there can be more trade diversion, under an FTA than under a
231
customs union.
Viewed through the prism of static gains, a customs union ought to
be preferred to an FTA. Forming a customs union covering the Is-
raeli and Palestinian economies, however, has its own deficiencies
and limitations. First, it runs contrary to the Palestinians' political
aspirations of establishing and manifesting their independence, both
politically and economically, from Israel. 2
Second, a customs union arrangement limits the Palestinians'
room to maneuver in negotiating with third countries, including other
Arab states, by locking them into the common external tariff of the
union, thus preventing them from offering preferential treatment to
countries outside the union. A customs union also makes it measura-
bly more difficult for Palestine to request other countries and inter-
national organizations to grant it preferential treatment.
Third, to the extent that the economic case for a customs union is
expressed in terms of more trade creation than trade diversion (and
no worse results on that account than under an FTA), political oppo-
sition is likely to arise. Trade creation is more likely to be viewed as
harming domestic producers than trade diversion, since the former
230. Kanafani, supra note 57, at 34-35.
231. Krueger, supra note 225, at 11-17. On the necessary economic assumptions
for this conclusion see id. at 15-16. But see Kanafani, supra note 57, at 36 (arguing
that a customs union has a certain potential of trade diversion that an FTA model
can avoid or at least minimize since under an FTA a member state can manage its
external tariff structure in a way that will better ensure that goods are imported
from the most efficient source, whether inside or outside the FTA). However, to
minimize trade diversion with respect to its imports under an FTA, a member state
must be able to impose lower customs duties on goods imported from countries
that are not members of the FTA than those that would be imposed under a cus-
toms union regime. See Kanafani, supra, at 36-37, 41-44. This is unlikely to be the
case with respect to the tariff structure of Palestine.
232. See Kleiman, supra note 95, at 686-89 (discussing decision-making proc-
esses in the framework of a customs union, in general, and the Paris Protocol, in
particular).
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means that domestic producers lose markets to producers from other
member states, whereas the latter means merely that the markets shift
from third country producers to producers located within the regional
trade arrangement. 33 With the possible domination of producer inter-
ests over consumer interests in the domestic political process, such
opposition is significant.2 4 This is especially so in the context of the
Israeli-Palestinian relations when stabilizing economic relations is
done contemporaneously with stabilizing political relations between
the two peoples. Hyper-sensitivities derived from entrenched suspi-
cion of the opposing party may quickly derail both processes.
Fourth, the experience of the implementation of the Paris Protocol
casts grave doubts about the applicability of the customs union
model in the region, at least at this stage of Israeli-Palestinian rela-
tions.
IV. A HYBRID MODEL
In the framework of a permanent peace settlement, the relative
shortcomings of the FTA and customs union models as viable struc-
tures for the economic relations between Israel and Palestine may be,
somewhat simplistically, summarized as follows: the FTA is better
on the political side but weaker on the economic side, while the
situation is reversed with respect to the customs union. Thus, there is
a need for a more sophisticated model that will combine the political
interests of sovereignty, national independence, and security with
national and regional economic welfare and development. Presenting
such an alternative model for structuring the economic relations be-
tween the two parties is the focus of this Part of the Article.
Based on a concept of flexible, permeable borders, the proposed
233. Krueger, supra note 225, at 21-22. However, it is not necessarily the case
that a customs union will result in more trade creation than an FTA. See Kanafani,
supra note 57, at 35-36.
234. See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTIO\ (1965)
(explaining how producer interests trump thinly-spread consumer interests due to
mobilization, lobbying costs, expected gains, and free riding). But see TREBILCOCK
& HOwSE, supra note 180, at 15-17 (critiquing the assumptions that domestic pro-
ducers that are easily politically mobilized uniformly favor protectionism, whereas
lay consumers who represent the sole or principal cost-bearers, are politically dis-
abled).
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model promotes bounded functional cooperation and integration
between Israel and the Palestinians. 35 The model facilitates coopera-
tion and integration while, at the same time, taking account of na-
tional aspirations and political desires. The distinctive feature of this
model is its attempt to combine elements from the FTA model with
the free movement of factors of production seen in a common mar-
ket, thus maximizing the particular benefits of each model while
minimizing its disadvantages in the particular context at hand.'
Furthermore, recognizing the economic downside of FTAs, the
model seeks to minimize the costs resulting from the existence of
economic borders.
Some of the contours of the model introduced below are drawn
along the lines that had been suggested for the first time by an infor-
mal joint Israeli-Palestinian team of senior economists, working tn-
der the auspices of the Norwegian government. After half a year of
intensive deliberations, the joint team produced an agreement de-
tailing a proposal for an "Economic Permanent Status model"
("EPS").28 This Part of the Article takes the EPS as its starting point,
analyzes some of its salient features, and makes further suggestions
concerning the structure of the economic relations between Israel and
Palestine to foster a long-standing and just peace in the region. The
Article goes on to suggest that while not necessarily a first-best
model, the proposed model may well offer the best practical chances
of achieving a successful accommodation of the relevant economic
235. See also KLIEMAN, supra note 215, at 120 (suggesting a "separate but to-
gether" concept for the economic relations between Israel and Palestine).
236. See Kleiman, supra note 48, at 371-72 (arguing that the Paris Protocol it-
self went down a somewhat similar road as the EPS suggesting that "Quantitatively
speaking, the [Paris Protocol] is first and foremost a customs union. But in allow-
ing also some, even if not completely free, movement of labour, it contains also an
element of a common market. In the exemptions of Lists A. I and A.2 it combines
also, albeit for limited quantities only, some elements of an FTA agreement."); See
also Kanafani, supra note 57, at 24-25.
237. This author took part in the work of the joint team as one of two legal advi-
sors to the Israeli negotiating team.
238. The Economic Cooperation Fund, DATA Studies and Consultation &
Higher Commission for Investment and Finance, The EPS Model - A Possible Set
qf lsraeli-Palestinian Economic Understandings for Permanent Status (Nov. 1998)
(on file with the author) [hereinafter ECF & DATA-HCIF].
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and political considerations.
(1) Independent Trade Policy and Decision-Making. To have any
meaningful chance of success in the Israeli-Palestinian context, a
model for economic integration of the two economies must recognize
and accommodate the Palestinian aspirations for national sovereignty
and independence. As the previous discussion demonstrates, this is
the major advantage presented by the FTA model and the main
weakness of the customs union model. Thus, the proposed model in-
corporates that element taken from the FTA regime in granting to
each participating state the ability to determine its own independent
trade policy with respect to third countries.!"9 At the same time, the
premise of the proposed model, like all other models of economic
integration, is the free movement of goods and services between the
two participating markets, subject to certain qualifications such as
conformity with standardization requirements of the importing state.
In their trade relations, the two trading partners commit themselves,
under the model, to refrain from imposing any tariffs, charges, levies,
duties, or taxes, or from using any measures having equivalent ef-
fects with respect to goods originating in the other member state or
exported to it.2 O They also agree to refrain from using any non-tariff
barriers to trade, such as quantitative restrictions, or other measures
having an equivalent effect.
Thus, the proposed model is aimed at enhancing the Palestinian
sense of independence from Israel by emphasizing the existence of
two sovereign states transacting with each other. Following the EPS
model's emphasis of "political separation and economic coopera-
tion"2'4' the proposed model underlines Palestinian political independ-
239. Id. at 17, Article A3(4)(b) (stating that "[w]ith regard to imports from
Third Parties, the Sides shall agree upon appropriate measures to preserve each
Side's respective import and taxation policies, while facilitating fast forwarding of
goods."). However, under the EPS the two parties commit to coordinate and even
harmonize, when appropriate, their "rates of customs, purchase tax, levies, excises
and other charges, and rules of origin," based on "their independent decision-
making." Id. at 17, Article A3(4)(c).
240. Id. at 19, Article B2(3).
241. Id. at 10 (Preamble) ("the shared vision of political separation and eco-
nomic cooperation based on partnership for growth and development."). Along the
same line, the EPS model does not include any mandatory requirement for harmo-
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ence and economic sovereignty.
(2) Clearance of Revenues and Flexible Borders. The issue of
revenue clearance proved to be an important one in the post-Paris
Protocol years. Article 111(15) of the Paris Protocol established the
place of final destination as the basis for the clearance of revenues
between Israel and the Palestinian Authority of all import taxes and
levies.24 ' Thus, if a product is imported into Israel with import docu-
mentation specifying the place of final destination as the territories
transferred to the control of the Palestinian Authority, Israel should
transfer the import-related revenues, collected at the port of entry
into Israel, to the Palestinian Authority. Although the Paris Protocol
concerned only import taxes and levies for the purpose of revenue
clearance, the same arrangement has been extended in practice to
cover also purchase taxes. 4 ' Revenues transferred by Israel to the
Palestinian Authority under the Paris Protocol constitute more than
sixty percent of the total revenues of the latter.'"
Import-related revenues have become a major stumbling block in
the process of economic normalization between Israel and the Pales-
tinians. First, the financial significance of these revenues to the Pal-
nizing the rate of the value added tax ("VAT") imposed in each country. Instead,
each of the trade partners enjoys full discretion to decide independently its own
VAT rate within broad, pre-set confines of a twelve percent to twenty-two percent
framework. Id. at 19, Article B2(l). Under the Paris Protocol, the Palestinian
Authority was authorized to levy VAT at one fixed rate of fifteen percent-sixteen
percent. Paris Protocol, supra note 7, Article 111(7). Similarly, the EPS sets flexible
provisions with respect to other taxes such as the purchase tax. See ECF & DATA-
HCIF, supra note 238, at 19, Art. B2(2). Both parties agreed, however, to apply an
identical rate of purchase tax with respect to an agreed upon list containing 15 to
20 products including, inter alia, durable goods, cigarettes, alcohol, and petroleum
products. Id. Art. B2(2)(a). The products to be included are those on which there is
a high rate of purchase tax imposed by Israel. Thus, the Israeli negotiators feared
the circumvention of the Israeli tax system and substantial trade deflection if Pal-
estine could impose a low purchase tax on such products.
242. See Paris Protocol, supra note 7, Art. 111(15) (discussing the clearance of
import taxes and levies between Israel and Palestine). Article VI(5) establishes the
rules for the clearance of VAT between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The
rest of the discussion in the text, however, refers only to the clearance of import
taxes and levies in accordance with Article 111(15). See id.
243. See Einhorn, supra note 74, at 441.
244. Arnon & Weinblatt, supra note 16, at 40.
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estinian Authority allowed the Israeli government to use them as a
"stick" to exert pressure on the Palestinian Authority. In reaction to
two consecutive suicide bombings in the central market of Jerusalem,
killing sixteen and injuring 178, Israel announced that it was stop-
ping the transfer of import-related revenues to the Palestinian
Authority.45 Israel stated that the transfer of revenues to the Pales-
tinian Authority would resume once the Authority cracked down
harder on Islamic terrorist groups operating in Palestinian territo-
ries.246
Second, the mechanism for clearance of revenues proved insuffi-
cient for dealing with certain phenomena of fiscal leakage, namely
the non-recovery of taxes on imports." These situations concern
goods imported into Israel (i.e., the place of final destination indi-
cated in the import documents was Israel) and then re-exported to the
Territories,248 inputs imported into Israel and later used in goods that
are exported to the Territories, and goods imported into the Territo-
ries (whether directly or indirectly via Israeli seaports and airports)
245. See Douglas Jehl, Palestitians Deprived ol'Fttus fron Israel, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 5, 1997, at 8; UNSCO, Closure, supra note 61 (implicating the Israeli Gov-
ernment's suspension of reimbursements of taxes and other fees owed to the Pal-
estinian Authority).
246. See Carmi Gillon, The Best IVay to Protect Israeli Security, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 17, 1997, at 15 (outlining the various attempts by the Israeli Government to
thwart Islamic terrorists groups operating within the Palestinian Territories). A
partial resumption of revenue clearance and transfer took place within less than a
month of the suicide bombings. See UNSCO, Closure. supra note 61; see also
Douglas Jehl, Israel Releases Some Palestinian Funds, But Sticking Points Re-
main, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1997, at A3 (discussing Israel's decision to freeze the
transfer of import-related revenues to the Palestinian Authority). One result of this
policy was a shift in import trends into the Palestinian territories from indirect im-
ports via Israel to direct imports, the revenues on which were directly collected by
the Palestinian Authority. Barnett, supra note 70. at 5.
247. See Kanafani, supra note 57, at 27-28 (discussing fiscal leakage in general
and in the Israeli-Palestinian context in particular).
248. See Molkner, supra note 72, at 1448 (according to Palestinian tax officials
estimates, "tens of millions of dollars of revenue, if not more, is [sic] being lost
annually on this basis.").
249. See Kanafani, supra note 57, at 27.
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and later re-exported into Israel."5 In each of these cases, a party to
the Paris Protocol does not receive import-related revenues it would
otherwise be entitled to under the Paris Protocol. Consumers in one
party to the Paris Protocol bear the burden of import tariffs and dIt-
ties, while the government of the other party collects and holds the
import revenues from such payments."' This creates competitive re-
lations between the two parties with respect to import revenues,
which are not conducive to establishing cooperation under the Paris
Protocol.52
A properly functioning FTA regime addresses the fiscal leakage
associated with revenue clearance by applying rules of origin in the
customs stations located at the border crossings between the member
countries, but this entails heavy economic costs. Some of the existing
customs unions and common markets demonstrate other solutions to
this problem while minimizing the potential interference with trade
that is inherent in an FTA regime. Thus, for example, customs and
other import duties imposed on non-member states are a source of
the European Community's revenues, which are then used for the
benefit of the Community as a whole.2'5 This solution is unlikely,
however, to be applicable to the Israeli-Palestinian context if only for
the fact that to be operative it requires a strong sense of community
that is absent in the region. The Southern African Customs Union
("SACU") is an interesting case insofar as it includes four small de-
veloping countries together with a significantly larger, more devel-
250. See Einhom, supra note 74, at 441-43 (suggesting that the de facto exten-
sion of the revenue clearance mechanism to purchase tax collected on imported
goods creates an incentive to trade diversion with respect to goods subject to high
rates of purchase tax under Israeli law). But see Kanafani, supra note 57, at 28.
251. See Kanafani, supra note 57, at 27.
252. Einhorn, supra note 74, at 441-43.
253. See, e.g., ROBSON, supra note 97, at 139-48; Einhorn, supra note 74, at
442.
254. See Guy Mundlak, The Limits of Labour Law in a Fungible Comtmunit,, in
LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALISATION (R.M. Fischl & K. Klare eds., forth-
coming 2001) (on file with the author) (noting that "[l]abour law in particular, and
social law in general, necessarily rely on a sense of community that is perceived by
its members as more than a marketplace. The fragile state of peace is yet to provide
a new sense of a regional community, but the current movement of capital across
borders distances the possibility of its establishment in the future.").
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oped country."5 The SACU implements a revenue-sharing formula
under which each member state transfers all the revenues from im-
port customs, excises, duties and charges collected by it to a central
pool managed by the Reserve Bank of South Africa. Thereafter, that
bank proceeds to divide the revenues among the member states ac-
cording to a set formula.26
It does not seem likely, however, that Israel and Palestine can
come to an agreement that would transfer all the import-related (and
potentially other) revenues to a joint pool. It is unlikely that either
would agree to the management of such a pool by a third party, or to
a national central bank dedicated to fulfilling that role. If the eco-
nomic regime between Israel and Palestine is to be aimed at com-
bining the political interests of sovereignty, national independence,
and security with national and regional economic welfare, the
SACU's precise revenue-sharing arrangement is an inappropriate
model.
Responding to these difficulties, the proposed model seeks to use
the economic borders between Israel and Palestine for revenue clear-
ance purposes (as under an FTA) while minimizing the adverse im-
plications of the existence of a border on the free, uninterrupted flow
of goods, services, and factors of production between Israel and Pal-
estine. While allowing for economic borders to exist within the
framework of economic integration in the region, the model makes
economic borders as flexible and permeable as possible in order to
make this FTA resemble a customs union. Each state is allowed to
establish monitoring stations within its territory' 5" that serve primar-
255. At present, SACU's five members are: Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swa-
ziland, and the Republic of South Africa. See ROBSON, supra note 97, at 275-76.
256. See Kanafani, supra note 57, at 51-56 (detailing the revenue sharing for-
mula implemented under the SACU); Robert Davies, The Southern African Cts-
toms Union (SACU): Background and Possible Issues fbr Negotiation Facilkg a
Democratic South African Government, in RECONSTITUTING AND DEMOCRA-,TISING
THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN CUSTOMS UNION 29, 29-35 (Max Sisulu et al. eds., 1994)
(discussing the revenue sharing formula as well as the economic significance of the
agreement); ROBSON, supra note 97, at 275-76.
257. The EPS joint team could not come to an agreement regarding the name of
these stations. Whereas the Palestinian members of the joint team insisted that the
stations be called "Customs Stations," the Israeli members suggested the name
"Entry Stations." This terminological quibble revisits the Palestinian desire to pull
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ily to accumulate information on trade flows between the two part-
ners and to monitor the movement of goods between them.2"' In a
sense, the stations serve as information collection facilities, docu-
menting the transfer of goods through them. The documentation and
information collected are used later as data for the operation of a
revenue clearance mechanism carried out on a government-to-
government level. In order to minimize the potential adverse impact
of an economic border on the free flow of trade between the two
partners - such as delays, paperwork and formalities, and potential
for corruption - these border stations are not used to collect taxes or
other payments from persons passing or goods processed through
them.
The operation of the stations in the information-collecting format
may improve the available data concerning fiscal leakage and enable
the parties to address the problematic situations on both the macro
and micro (i.e., transaction-by-transaction) levels. However, it is ap-
parent that this mechanism is not sufficient, in and of itself, to pre-
vent the recurrence of phenomena such as one country stopping uni-
laterally revenue transference due to its trading partner. In the
absence of political will to cooperate and work together economic
and legal arrangements will not suffice. However, in an attempt to
minimize the occurrence of such abuses, another feature of the pro-
posed model is a meaningful dispute settlement mechanism.2 5
(3) Movement of Factors of Production. An important element of
the proposed model concerns labor services. As noted above, neither
an FTA nor a customs union requires free movement of factors of
production. Both models refer only to free movement of goods and
services. The proposed model adds to the basic structure the free
movement of factors of production.2 60 Thus, under the EPS, both par-
in the direction of an FTA with maximum symbols of sovereignty, while the Is-
raelis sought the "economically superior" customs union arrangement.
258. ECF & DATA-HCIF, supra note 238, at 21-23, Art. B5.
259. See infra notes 282-284 and accompanying text (discussing dispute settle-
ment under the proposed model).
260. See, e.g., Krueger, supra note 225, at 6 (noting that "an FTA might provide
for some arrangements permitting greater mobility of factors of production"). It
should be noted that there are those who consider the EPS' emphasis on free
movement of labor to be misdirected. The argument is often made that a shift from
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ties agree to "free, normal, and reciprocal cross-border movement of
labor to allow Israeli and Palestinian citizens to enter the territory of
the other side respectively, in order to work or to seek employ-
ment., 261 It is difficult to overemphasize the significance of this
commitment. As noted above, Palestinian workers' employment in
Israel has played a crucial role in the shaping up of the Palestinian
economy. Yet, the Paris Protocol did not include a firm commitment
to the free movement of workers from the Territories into Israel. .' - It
may be questioned whether an explicit legal guarantee of free
movement of labor could have mitigated the effects of the closure
policy on the Palestinian economy. However, the absence of such a
guarantee certainly removed a potential breaking mechanism on the
slippery closure slope.
Freedom of movement may collide at times with the security
needs of the parties to the agreement. Thus, each party ought to be
allowed to restrict the entry of the other party's workers into its own
territory for security reasons. 63 At the same time there is a need for
direct Palestinian export of labor services to Israel to an indirect export - via the
export of Palestinian, domestically manufactured goods - is desirable. See, e.g.,
Meshar, supra note 90, at 667-70; RICHARD LAYARD ET AL., EAST-WEST
MIGRATION: THE ALTERNATIVES (1993). But see Kleiman. supra note 95, at 682
(replacing export of labor service with export of labor intensive goods is a long-run
process).
261. ECF & DATA-HCIF, supra note 238, at 30, Art. DI( 1).
262. See Paris Protocol, supra note 7, Art. VII( 1) (stating that "[b]oth sides will
attempt to maintain the normality of movement of labor between them, subject to
each side's right to determine from time to time the extent and conditions of the
labor movement into its area.") (emphases added). See Kleiman, supra note 48, at
356-57; Leila Farsakh, Labor Related Articles in the Economic Protocol (1999)
(analyzing the text of the labor related articles of the Paris Protocol and examining
the extent to which they have been implemented in practice). On the use of vague
language in the Oslo process see, e.g., AHARON KLIEMAN. CONSTRUCTIVE
AMBIGUITY IN MIDDLE EAST PEACE-MAKING (1999): Jasmine Jordaan, Proposal
of Dispute Resolution Mechanisns for the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement:
A Crucial Step in Establishing Long-Terni Economic Stability in Palestine and a
Lasting Peace, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 555, 593 (1997) (the Paris protocol and the
Interim Agreement are "steeped with vague generalized language."); Khoury, su-
pra note 138, at 39-40.
263. See ECF & DATA-HCIF, supra note 238, at 30, Art. Dl(2) ("Free move-
ment of labor can only be restricted for reasons directly related to public health,
public security, and the general rule of law and order").
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mechanisms that limit either party's ability to abuse this power of
imposing restrictions. A model seeking to facilitate the "free, normal,
and reciprocal cross-border movement of labor ' 26 between Israel and
Palestine needs to include safeguards against the use of "national se-
curity" and similar arguments as mere pretexts to unwarranted inter-
vention and interference with the free movement of workers. From
the legal perspective the basis for implementing such mechanisms is
found in putting the onus to prove that a particular restriction on free
movement is justified and warranted squarely on the shoulders of the
restricting party. The basic rule is that of freedom of movement. Any
restriction or deviation from that general rule must be justified.26 ' In-
deed, the need to give reasons and publicly explain and defend one's
actions serves, in and of itself, as a limitation on state action.2 6
In addition, other measures designed to facilitate "quick cross-
border movement of labor '267 must be considered. Such measures
may include, for example, a centralized computer network, effective
identification system, coordination mechanism regarding the move-
ment of vehicles, and coordinated procedures for temporary presence
of Israeli and Palestinian workers in the territory of the other party.
In addition to these mechanisms, which are designed to prevent
unwarranted interference with the movement of labor, other meas-
ures designed to positively promote such movement ought to be con-
sidered. Thus, for example, recognizing the particular significance of
Palestinian employment in Israel to Palestine's welfare, and realizing
the social benefits that Israel stands to reap from employing Pales-
tinians rather than third country foreign workers, the EPS model calls
for the granting of financial incentives - including tax benefits - to
Israeli employers that prefer Palestinian workers over foreign ones,
264. Id.at3O,Art.D1(1).
265. See Garvey, supra note 72, at 174-77 (discussing the significance of the
need to find justifications as a check against the arbitrary use of power).
266. See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REv. 633, 656-57
(1995) (suggesting that the process of giving reasons commits governmental actors
and limits their freedom of action and decision).
267. ECF & DATA-HCIF, supra note 238, at 45, Art. J3(4).
268. Id.
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all other things being equal.!" The EPS model also envisions stronger
ties between Israeli and Palestinian public employment services and
trade unions. Finally, it is suggested that Israel and Palestine enter
into a bilateral agreement regulating the working conditions and so-
cial rights of nationals of one party employed in the territory of the
other party or by persons or firms who are nationals of the other
party, based on international conventions, in order to minimize inci-
dences of exploitation.
(4) Asymmetries and Differential Treatment. As noted above, there
are vast asymmetries between the Israeli and the Palestinian econo-
mies. To be successful in the long run, any economic arrangement
between Israel and Palestine must consider this asymmetry.:" Such
an arrangement can, and indeed should, seek to counter the existing
asymmetry with asymmetries of its own, by facilitating differential
treatment with respect to the two parties involved, thus giving the
smaller Palestinian economy more time to adjust to integration.
Differential treatment trade structures among countries at varying
stages of economic development are common on both the multilat-
eral and regional trade levels.2*" In the Israeli-Palestinian context,
269. Id.at 31, Art. D3(3)(b) ("Each Side shall not impose VAT on its employers
who directly employ employees of the other Side"). A study published in February
1997 by Kav La'Oved (Workers' Hotline), an Israeli non-profit organization fo-
cusing on the protection of the fights of workers in Israel, showed that the cost for
an Israeli employer of employing a Palestinian worker are forty percent higher than
the costs involved in retaining a foreign worker to do the same job. Kay La'Oved,
Newsletter, Feb. 1997, at 1-2 (on file with the author). Under these conditions it is
clear that the Palestinian employment seeker stands no chance in competing with
the foreign worker in the Israeli market. See also Kay La'Oved, Newsletter, Nov.
1999.
270. Indeed the first principle for economic permanent status agreed on by the
EPS joint team was that of "[c]onsideration of the differences in development be-
tween the two economies." ECF & DATA-HCIF, supra note 238, at 16, Art.
A2(1); see also id. at 17, Article A4 ("Adherence to the Differences in Economic
Development").
271. See, e.g., Philippe Cullet, Differential Treatment in International Last: To-
wards a New Paradigm of Inter-state Relations, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 549 (1999)
(discussing at length the increased use of differential treatment as a means for
making international law more responsive to the new challenges of globalization
and for fostering substantive equality among states). See also Organization of
American States, Trade Unit, Special and Differential Treatment in International
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asymmetrical arrangements can pertain, for example, to allowing
greater tolerance for government sponsored promotional measures,
such as domestic and export subsidization, on the part of the Pales-
tinian government than on the part of its Israeli counterpart 22 differ-
ential time frames for the implementation of various commitments
such as those pertaining to market access, and differential require-
ments as far as substantive obligations are concerned. One example
of such differential treatment may address the issue of rules of origin.
With the Palestinian economy being as small as it is, applying identi-
cal rules of origin to identifying Israeli and Palestinian goods that
would enjoy free movement under the agreement between the parties
may prove too difficult for the Palestinians, who may, for example,
be unable to meet the relatively high levels of required added
value.2 11 Setting a parallel system for rules of origin - used for identi-
fying "Israeli" and "Palestinian" goods under different quantitative
or qualitative criteria - may prove beneficial in this context.7 4 In-
jecting future trade relations between Israel and Palestine with an
element of differential treatment minimizes the perceived political
risks of an economic integration as far as the weak partner to the ne-
gotiations is concerned, by addressing some of the fears of economic
Trade (1996). But see Kotschwar, supra note 47, at 152-53 (arguing that the age of
differential treatment is coming to an end).
272. See Vernon et al., supra note 33, at 64.
273. See Moshe Hirsch, The Asymmetric Incidence of Rules of Origin: Will
Progressive and Cumulation Rules Resolve the Problem?, 32 J. WORLD TRADE 41
(1998). Hirsch argues that: "[t]he restrictive impact of rules of origin is not equal
for all trading parties ... a party with a larger factor endowment pool is less con-
strained by the operation of rules of origin .... " li. at 45. The EPS envisions the
use of progressive rules of origin by allowing for the possibility of according pref-
erential treatment to Palestinian goods in so far as "the value of local ingredients in
a Palestinian good can be lower than the value of local ingredients in an identical
Israeli good." ECF & DATA-HCIF, supra note 238, at 26, Art. C2(3)(e)(1). It is
also specified that "[t]he extent and scope of the preferential treatment to a certain
good shall be gradually phased out based on an agreed-upon timetable." Id., Arti-
cle C2(3)(e)(2).
274. Hirsch, supra note 273, at 47-50 (arguing that there are two mechanisms to
address the asymmetric restrictive impacts of rules of origin on trading states with
different factor pools, namely the use of progressive rules of origin and the cumu-
lation of origin). Hirsch explains that cumulation of origin may be used as a
mechanism to enhance cooperation in strife-ridden areas such as the Middle East.
Id. at 52-53.
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take-over by the economically stronger partner.:- At the same time,
creating such asymmetries is unlikely to cause grave harm to the Is-
raeli economy precisely because of the vast differences in size be-
tween the two markets.
(5) Redistribution of Benefits. Orthodox economic trade theory
speaks of the benefits reaped from free trade in aggregate, national
terms. It does not purport to address distributional issues. Yet, the
distribution of benefits created by economic integration is critical,
especially in the Israeli-Palestinian context. As a result of the phe-
nomenon of polarization, some domestic regions may be dispropor-
tionately hurt by integration, as industries and businesses may settle
in, or relocate to, other alternative sites within the integrated re-
gion.76 It is quite likely that regions already economically disadvan-
taged prior to the integration will be most hurt by such an economic
move, resulting in further adverse social and economic effects.2-
Thus, the move toward economic integration between economically
stronger and substantially weaker states may be opposed in the for-
mer, particularly by those fearful for their jobs as a result of "pauper
labor" competition. In the latter, objections may be made by in-
dustrialists fearful that their industries cannot compete with the more
sophisticated and more powerful industries of the economically
stronger trading partner. While this may be the case in other situa-
tions of economic integration between parties that are economically
unbalanced, in the Israeli-Palestinian context the stakes are much
higher. Economic integration is not an end, but rather a means of
procuring and maintaining long-lasting peace in the region. The just
nature of such peace is a crucial element affecting its longevity and
prospects for success. Peace dividends must be felt and seen as tan-
gible by all social and economic strata of the relevant societies. If
not, mutual blame of the other party for one's woes is certain to fol-
275. See, e.g., Meshar, supra note 90, at 670.
276. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
277. See, e.g., ALI M. EL-AGRAA, THE EUROPEAN UNION - HISTORY,
INSTITUTIONS, ECONOMICS AND POLICIES 369-77 (5th ed. 1998) (discussing the
forces of convergence and divergence of regional disparities in the European Un-
ion).
278. See supra notes 179-180 and accompanying text.
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low suit, thus threatening to topple the entire peace structure in the
region.
Here again, experience of other countries is instructive. Redis-
tributive arrangements are found in the context of higher levels of
economic integration. Thus, for example, there is no mechanism built
into NAFTA to deal with fiscal transfer payments for the redistribu-
tion of the agreement's benefits among the trading partners. On the
other hand, the revenue sharing formula used in the SACU includes
compensatory and distributive elements designed to improve the
economic situation of the four economically weaker parties to that
arrangement. That formula is designed to compensate the smaller
members of SACU for trade diversion, polarization, and the loss of'
fiscal sovereignty as a result of that economic integration with their
much larger neighbor.279 Recognizing the existence of regional dis-
parities within the members of the European Union, a regional policy
implemented through the use of four structural funds was adopted.2""'
This regional policy, aimed at improving the economic conditions in
"lagging regions," "declining industrial regions," certain rural re-
gions, and areas with very low population densities, is designed to
counter regional disparities as well as the potential for a growing di-
vergence of those disparities resulting from the integration process.
The Cohesion Fund, which is aimed at providing "a financial contri-
bution to projects in the fields of environment and trans-European
networks in the area of transport infrastructure," also complements
the structural funds."" Certainly, these attempts to ensure greater de-
gree of regional convergence in economic performance within the
European Union are a by-product of a developed sense of community
279. See ROBSON, supra note 97, at 275-76 (elaborating upon the SACU for-
mula for revenue sharing); Kanafani, supra note 57, at 51-56.
280. See, e.g., EL-AGRAA, supra note 277, at 377-84. Art. 130a of the Treaty on
European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, OJ 1992 C 191/1, 31 ILM 247 (1992), in force
Nov. 1, 1993 (the Treaty of Maastricht) states that:
In order to promote its overall harmonious development, the [European]
Community shall develop and pursue its actions leading to the strengthening
of its economic and social cohesion. In particular, the Community shall aim at
reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various regions
and the backwardness of the least favoured regions, including rural areas.
281. Treaty on European Union, supra note 280, Article 130d.
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that transcends national boundaries.
In the absence of a strong trans-boundary community in the Mid-
dle East, it is difficult to perceive of supranational regional policies.
However, even in the absence of a central, supranational organiza-
tion setting such policies, the possibility of fiscal transfer payments
that can be used by national authorities to implement domestic re-
gional policy should be considered as a component of regional inte-
gration.
(6) Dispute Settlement Mechanism. An important feature of the
international trade system is the move from a power-oriented system
to rule-oriented, normative, legalistic structures.!2 In the Israeli-
Palestinian context, this transformation is of particular significance
because a rule-based dispute settlement mechanism holds the prom-
ise of channeling political disputes through economic and legal pres-
sure releasing valves, thus diffusing the political components of the
disputes in the process.28 Furthermore, given the economic differ-
282. See, e.g., JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZ-ATION -
CONSTITUTION AND JURISPRUDENCE 60-62 (1998) (suggesting that a rule-oriented
approach has considerable advantage over a diplomacy-oriented approach, espe-
cially in matters concerning international economic affairs); Hannes L. Schloe-
mann & Stefan Ohlhoff, "Constitutionalization " and Dispute Settlement in the
WTO: National Security as an Issue of Competence, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 424, 424
(1999) (observing that "the emergence of the WTO and its rule-based, quasi-
obligatory dispute settlement system has spurred a significant shift toward legal-
ism. Constitutional structures are developing much faster in international trade law
than in any other area of international law. .. "); Michael K. Young, Dispute
Resolution in the Uruguay Round: Lawyers Triumph over Diplomats, 29 I\T'L
LAW. 389, 391 (1995) (highlighting the shift towards a more legalistic approach to
the regulation of international trade). See also Miguel Montafia Mora, A GA TT
with Teeth: Law Wins Over Politics in the Resolution ol'International Trade Dis-
putes, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 103 (1993); G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism
and International Relations Theori': An Analysis of the World Trade Organization,
44 DUKE L.J. 829, 833-34 (1995); Arie Reich, From Diplonacv to Law: The Ju-
ridicization of International Trade Relations, 17 J. INr'L L. Bus. 775, 776 (1997);
Mark L. Movsesian, Sovereignty, Compliance, and the Worhl Trade Organization:
Lessons fiom the History of Supreme Court Review, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 775, 777-
78 (1999).
283. See, e.g., Garvey, supra note 72, at 166-67, 181-83 (explaining the neu-
tralization of confrontation through multi-polar participation in the resolution of
trade disputes and the professionalization of disputes as a mechanism to diffuse
their political nature).
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ences between the parties, and in light of the inherent suspicion pre-
vailing between them, a rule-based dispute settlement mechanism
serves to put Israel and Palestine on a more equal footing and mini-
mize fears of "might makes right." Thus, the particular dispute set-
tlement mechanism concerning the economic agreement between Is-
rael and Palestine ought to be of a different nature than the
mechanism put in place to resolve "political" disputes. While the
latter is more geared toward diplomatic negotiations, the former is
rule-based. -84
The proposed model seeks to balance economic considerations,
pulling in the direction of increased integration between the Israeli
and Palestinian economies, with political considerations, pointing
mostly in the direction of separation. To achieve that balance, the
model goes beyond traditional understandings concerning models of
economic integration, picking and choosing from among their spe-
cific features. While the advantages of this approach are evident, so
are its weaknesses. Thus, the proposed model has in it certain ele-
ments that are open to abuse and manipulation designed to interfere
with free movement of goods, services and factors of production
between the two states. The central role played by elements derived
from the traditional FTA model clearly opens the door for precisely
that sort of critique that is leveled against the deficiencies of FTAs.
Yet, the proposed model for the future economic relations between
Israelis and Palestinians stands a good chance of maintaining an ade-
quate balance between the competing interests set out in this article,
at least through the first stages of transformation of the political rela-
tions between the two peoples from hostility to a just and long-
lasting peace. As it is not a first-best model of economic integration,
this model may be replaced eventually by deeper regional integra-
tion. Indeed, as the two parties' relations become increasingly nor-
malized, the balance between economic and political considerations
may change and shift, leading them to adopt a different structure for
economic integration. Such structure may also include within its am-
284. But see ECF & DATA-HCIF, supra note 238, at 51 n.4 (suggesting that
"[the dispute settlement mechanism under the EPS] shall be consistent with the
general provision on Settlement of Disputes that will be concluded in the compre-
hensive Permanent Status Agreement.").
1624 [15:1539
ISRAELI-PALESTINI.4N PE..ICE
bit the expansion and extension of economic integration to other
countries in the region. Here too, one must recognize a major ad-
vantage of the proposed model, namely its inherent flexibility, which
enables the parties to move easily from that model to other models of
economic integration in the future.
CONCLUSION
The area stretching between the Jordan River and the Mediterra-
nean Sea is a small one, measuring a mere 27,000 square kilometers.
It is here that Israelis and Palestinians have to live together in peace.
Any hope of enjoying peace and tranquility in any one section of this
small neighborhood depends on the ability to ensure that most people
living in that area are content. ' 8 While not sufficient in and of itself
to achieve that goal, economic well-being is a necessary condition
for the attainment of peace. As John Kenneth Galbraith observed,
laughter and economics strongly tie into peace.2" In such a tight
geographical space, separation and segregation cannot work in the
long run. What happens in one part of the neighborhood necessarily
spills over and affects life in the other parts. For much too long the
neighborhood has been considered a bad one. Tourists were hesitant
about visiting it, despite its beauty and historic and religious attrac-
tions; foreign investors were reluctant to invest money and resources
into that area, despite its economic potential; and local residents
wishing to defend themselves against attacks on their person and
property spent precious resources and vast amounts on security
measures, running high military expenditures.
The concept of "having something to lose" as a counter to vio-
lence seems to work well on the national and international level. It
has worked extremely well in the European context. It can do the
same in the Israeli-Palestinian context. But it should not come as a
285. See, e.g., Kemal Dervis & Nemat Shafik, The Middle East and North J.-
rica: A tale of two futures, 52 MIDDLE EAST J. 505 (1998) (discussing "regional
neighborhoods" where countries are affected by economic spillover effects origi-
nating outside their own borders). This may be considered in the broader context of
discussing positive and negative externalities on a regional-wide basis.
286. See GALBRAITH, supra note 119, at ix (explaining the author's reasons for
including essays on economics, peace, and laughter within the same book).
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"carrot" handed by one party to the other as a reward for the latter
conducting its business in a way that accords to the former's interests
and wishes. Rather, both Israelis and Palestinians must work to-
gether, on the basis of their shared economic interests and stakes in
the attainment of long-lasting, just, and comprehensive peace in the
Middle East. 287 Promoting peace in the region is a joint task, not a
unilateral project. Unilateral dependence is to be replaced by mutual
interdependence. Economic liberalization and integration, coupled
with a healthy degree of political sensitivity and fine-tuning, may to-
gether form a solid basis upon which to build the Middle Eastern
neighborhood for the benefit of future generations.
287. See LAWRENCE, supra note 163, at 9 (a cautionary remark made by a joint
team of Israeli, Jordanian and Palestinian experts that reviewed the prospects of
establishing free trade arrangements in the Middle East stating that: "the greater
political vulnerabilities [of smaller economies in the context of economic integra-
tion with substantially larger economies] imply that the initiative for these ar-
rangements should come from the smaller partners and they should certainly not be
imposed, or perceived to be imposed, by the larger partner." ).
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